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ABSTRACT
Efforts to reform the public sector reflect the social, political and
economic environment within which government must function. The recent
demands by the public for more consensual decision-making, as well as more
efficient, effective and responsive public service, have resulted in a number
of reform initiatives, including an emphasis on partnership development.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine partnership arrangements within
the public sector. Specifically, the thesis will assess the value of partnerships
and their impact on government by examining six partnership arrangements
involving the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR). The OMNR,
having recently been awarded the 1992 Institute of Public Administration of
Canada Award for Innovative Management, on the theme of partnership
development, is being lauded as an example for other government agencies
considering similar alliances.
The thesis begins by introducing the concept and practice of partnership
within the public sector in general and the OMNR specifically. Descriptive
analysis of six OMNR partnerships is provided and a number of criteria are
used to determine the success of each of these arrangements. Special
attention is paid to the political implications of partnerships and to those
attributes which appear to contribute to the successful establishment and
iii
maintenance of partnership arrangements.
The conclusion is drawn that partnerships provide the government with
an opportunity to address public demands for greater involvement in
decision-making while accommodating government's limited financial
resources. However, few truly collaborative partnerships exist within the
public sector. There are also significant political implications associated with
partnerships which must be dealt with both at the political and bureaucratic
levels of government. Lastly, it is argued that while partnerships within the
OMNR are experiencing some difficulties, they constitute a genuine attempt
to broaden the base of decision-making and to incorporate the concerns of
stakeholders into resource management.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ABSTRACT
CHAPTER
ONE INTRODUCTION
i
ii
1
Purpose of Thesis 2
Research Methodology..................... 5
Content of Thesis 8
The Globalization of Public Sector Reform.. 10
TWO PUBLIC PARTNERSHIP IN ONTARIO: AN OVERVIEW.. 18
Partnership: Concept and Definition 19
Partnership and the OMNR 30
THREE COLLABORATIVE PARTNERSHIPS 42
The Algonquin Forestry Authority......... 43
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Partnership Creation 49
Partnership Operation 51
Tupper/Shields Co-operative Management
Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
History .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Partnership Creation 61
Partnership Operation 63
FOUR CONSULTATIVE PARTNERSHIPS 75
Management in the Magpie Forest 76
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Partnership Creation 81
Partnership Operation 82
WeIland River Cleanup Project Planning
Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Partnership Creation 91
Partnership Operation 92
FIVE OPERATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 101
The Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility..... 102
History . . . . . . . . . . 103
Partnership Creation 107
Partnership Operation 108
vThe Goodyear Fishway 111
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Partnership Creation 113
Partnership Operation 114
SIX POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS: PUBLIC SECTOR
PARTNERSHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
A Tradition of Responsibility............ 120
Partnerships and Cooptation 130
Power-Sharing and the Government-
Stakeholder Relationship 133
SEVEN EVALUATING PARTNERSHIP SUCCESS 141
Partnership Evaluation 142
Partnership Success Factors 154
Limitations to Public Sector Partnerships.. 160
EIGHT CONCLUSIONS 165
Summary and General Conclusions 166
Recommendations 178
APPENDICES
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
Partnership Definition and Categories
District Questionnaire .
Questionnaire: Government Partners .
Questionnaire: Non-Government Partners
District Questionnaire Responses .
OMNR Partnership Summaries by Category
Sociogram: Magpie Forest .
184
186
187
189
191
192
196
BIBLIOGRAPHY 197
1Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Throughout Canada's history there have been many movements to reform
the public sector and each of these movements has helped to shape the way
in which government functions today.! Current efforts at public sector reform
have the potential for a staggering impact on both the administration of
government and on the nature of government-stakeholder or, more narrowly,
government-client relations. These efforts are a priority not only in Canada,
but also in many other governments around the world. The similarities of
these attempts at public sector management reform speak to the common
pressures which governments now face.
In Canada, government partnerships are one approach to public sector
reform. While they exist at all levels of government and in many shapes and
sizes, the theme remains the same: elected representatives and public officials
functioning in 'partnership' with the public.
The objectives of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR),
reflecting a mandate which deals with a public commodity, namely the
distribution and protection of our public natural resources, are particularly
conducive to government partnerships. This is evidenced by the identification
of partnership as a major element of the OMNR's strategic direction for the
21990's and the existence of partnership arrangements as early as the 1940's.
In addition, the OMNR has recently been awarded the 1992 Institute of Public
Administration of Canada Award for Innovative Management on the theme of
partnership management. While the Ministry has participated in partnership
arrangements for decades, the renewed commitment to the approach is
occurring at the same time as the Ministry and, indeed, the Ontario
government as a whole, is attempting to establish a framework for service
quality. This thesis will explore the nature of partnerships in the OMNR and
their impact on government.
Chapter one begins by explaining the intent and methodology of this
thesis. Following this, the reader will be provided with an outline of the
thesis contents, proposed success factors which will guide the examination of
specific cases, and six tentative hypotheses. Finally, this chapter will present
a brief overview of public sector reform movements both in Canada and in
other countries, as well as the general policy environment within which
government partnership is being pursued in Canada.
PURPOSE OF THESIS
Rosabeth Moss Kanter states that the use of partnerships and joint
ventures as a strategic imperative in today's corporations results from attempts
to manage change and respond to the demands of a global economy. Kanter
3compares this global economy to a corporate olympics in which companies
must juggle the contradictory challenges of conserving resources while also
pursuing innovation.2
In Canada, the competing challenges to which Kanter refers can be
observed in both the public and private sectors. ~ncreasing demands by the
public for more consensual decision-making, greater levels of public
participation, and a higher quality of public service, combined with economic
pressures within the government itself, have resulted in a period of severe
fiscal restraint. The need to produce 'more with less' is manifested in
movements such as the Service-Quality movement and government initiatives
such as Public Service 2000 (PS 2000) at the federal level and Best Value for
Tax Dollars at the provincial level in Ontario.3
Partnership arrangements provide an opportunity for public sector
managers to increase the quality of public service with fewer resources while
at the same time answering the call for greater public involvement in
decision-making. However, the road to successful partnership is not always
smooth. As public officials disperse power and authority by allowing the
public to assume decision-making responsibilities, they must also
accommodate demands for democratic accountability, both to their political
masters and to the public. Partnership agreements, by their very nature, are
fraught with difficulties and accompanied by risks. Public officials must,
4therefore, be cognizant of the limitations to partnership in the public sector
and must pursue these agreements with care.
The potential implications of innovative management practices such as
partnership should be of interest to political scientists, politicians and scholars.
The suitability of the parliamentary traditions of ministerial responsibility and
bureaucratic accountability in modern government are often debated. Scholars
generally acknowledge that the process of governing is, at the very least,
becoming increasingly complex. We must ask ourselves, therefore, how this
new way of 'doing business' through innovative management practices like
partnerships will affect both our parliamentary traditions and the bureaucracy
which has developed to manage our resources.
This thesis will describe and analyse partnership agreements within the
OMNR. The degree of commitment to the agreements will be assessed as
will their impact on government-stakeholder relations and the traditions of
ministerial responsibility and accountability. In particular, the extent to which
power or authority is actually dispersed will be determined. In addition, the
thesis will address assertions by some theorists that partnerships provide a
mechanism for reducing public criticism of government policy. The
environment in which partnerships have been established will be examined to
determine if interest group activity and/or political pressure contributed to
their development.
5An assessment will also be made of the degree of success achieved in
each of the partnerships studied. Finally, a number of factors which may be
critical to the success of partnership arrangements will be examined and
recommendations made regarding the best means of establishing and
preserving successful partnerships.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The initial research task undertaken for this thesis was the collection and
review of literature relating to public sector reform, service-quality and
partnership. While ample scholarly material is available regarding the first
two topics, literature specifically relating to partnership is more limited. An
extensive review of articles in scholarly journals as well as government
publications provided insight into the Canadian experience in these areas.
Following the literature review, a survey was distributed to each of the
Districts within the OMNR to assess the types of partnership arrangements
currently in existence. These data also proved useful in illustrating the degree
to which OMNR staff understand the concept of partnership. The
questionnaire for the District survey is contained in Appendix B of this thesis.
Results from the District survey and the 14 partnership cases submitted
by the OMNR to the 1992 IPAC competition on Innovative Management
provided the data from which six case studies were selected. Partnership
6arrangements were selected on the basis of their representativeness of the
various types of partnerships identified in scholarly writings as well as their
representativeness within the OMNR. Criteria for category representation
included the number of partners involved in the partnership, its longevity and
the degree of formalization associated with the arrangement. At least one
agreement was selected from each of the four regions in the OMNR so that
differences in both geography and client type would be represented. Since it
could not be expected that district staff would provide data on 'failed'
attempts, it is assumed that each case submitted was considered by the OMNR
to be successful.
Chapter two will provide a working definition and four categories of
partnership. The OMNR partnerships examined in this thesis fall into three
of these four categories. Since so-called "contributory partnerships" are not
generally viewed as "true" partnerships, it was decided early on in the research
that the questions being considering in this thesis dId not apply to this type of
arrangement.
Two case studies were selected to represent each of the three remaining
partnership categories as follows:
Location Partnership
Algonquin Park
Sault Ste. Marie
Wawa
Algonquin Forestry Authority Collaborative
Tupper/Shields Comanagement Committee Collaborative
Magpie Forest Co-Management Advisory
WeIland
Thunder Bay
Bowmanville
7
WeIland River Remedial Action Plan
Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility
Goodyear Fishway
Advisory
Operational
Operational
Once the case studies had been selected, interviews were conducted with
individuals associated with each partnership. Government officials provided
useful insights into the history of the partnership as well as the motivation for
its creation. An extensive review of government documents and files,
including formal reports, memoranda and legislative briefs provided additional
background information relating to the environment within which the
partnership was established.
Similarly, personal interviews were conducted with non-governmental
partners. These individuals provided a unique perspective both on the
motivation for each partnership's creation and on the degree of success which
it has achieved.
Interviews were conducted in an open-ended format. Questionnaires
utilized for the governmental and non-governmental partners (see Appendixes
C and D) were slightly different, reflecting the differing perspectives which
these groups have.
Analysis is both descriptive and comparative in nature. A description of
each of the six cases provides general information regarding the partnership
itself and the political and/or policy environment in which it was established.
8A comparative analysis of the cases identifies factors which are present or
absent in each case and provides a foundation for assessing success factors
and political implications.
The OMNR presently participates in thousands· of partnership agreements.
For this reason, it is difficult to extrapolate from only six case studies
principles which will apply to all partnerships. However, while the OMNR
does not have an inventory of partnerships by type, many of its partnerships
are generic agreements which have been centrally conceived as part of a
particular program. As a result, while the partners may change, there is little
variety to the format and structure of these partnerships. The non-generic
partnership agreements represent unique responses to specific situations within
the various districts of that ministry. Consideration will be given, therefore,
to the presence of a particular type of partnership in the OMNR when
assessing success factors and making recommendations.
CONTENT OF THESIS
Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter will provide an
overview of partnership agreements, a working definition of partnership, and
the categories used in this thesis. The concept of a partnership continuum,
based on the degree to which power is shared, will be introduced. Chapter
two will also outline the OMNR's approach to partnership, the history and
9philosophy of these agreements within that ministry and the policy
environment within which partnerships are being promoted.
Chapters three to five will provide descriptive data relating to the six case
studies under examination. Each of the three chapters will deal with one
partnership category. The criteria determining classification and the extent
and nature of each type of partnership within the OMNR will be specifically
outlined.
Each partnership will be examined to determine the social and political
environment in which it was established and the key individuals involved. A
thorough review of the objectives, structure and operation of each agreement
will be provided as well as an account of any difficulties encountered along
the way.
Chapter SIX will examIne the political implications of partnership
agreements. The first component of this chapter will provide theoretical and
practical frameworks for evaluating the impact of these agreements on the
doctrines of ministerial responsibility and accountability. The extent to which
real power-sharing has occurred as a result of these agreements will be
determined. In addition, the impact which these partnerships have had on the
government-stakeholder relationship will be examined. Chapter seven
will provide criteria for, and an assessment of, the success of these
partnerships. Four success factors will be examined to determine their impact
10
on the outcome of the partnership, and limitations to partnership success will
be discussed.
The final chapter will summarize the data and arguments presented in the
thesis and will relate them to the following hypotheses:
1. While partnership agreements blur the practice of accountability,
they do not alter the formal accountability relationships in
government today.
2. Partnerships can make criticism of government policy difficult by
making government critics a 'part of the process'.
3. Public sector partnerships which result in real power-sharing are
infrequent and usually developed in an environment subject to
political pressure and/or intensive interest group activity.
4. Partnership agreements can work if they are developed with care
and commitment.
5. Partnerships which have been developed with a fairly equitable
balance of power and/or a high level of commitment by all the
partners are more likely to succeed.
6. Partnerships with fairly narrow objectives and which have been
formalized in some way are more likely to succeed.
The last component of chapter eight will provide recommendations for
governments considering establishing a partnership agreement.
THE GLOBALIZATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
The globalization phenomenon, which currently affects the economies of
many countries, also applies to approaches to reform in public sector
11
management. During the 1980's, for example, many governments introduced
practices such as downsizing, contracting out and privatization, as well as
exploring various new management philosophies such as Total Quality
Management (TQM).4 Efforts to apply a private sector approach to public
management also crossed national boundaries. In J\ustralia, Neville Wran, the
former Premier of New South Wales, attempted to impose the same financial
discipline and performance criteria present in the private sector on government
departments. Similarly, in Great Britain the Financial Management Initiative,
and in Canada, PS 2000, both attempt to make government 'leaner and
meaner' by utilizing some of the values traditionally found in private
business.5
The explanation for this globalization of reform rests on the presence of
common factors such as the advanced means of communication between
governments, the difficulties associated with cutting programs during periods
of fiscal restraint, and pressures by the business communities in various
countries to modernize government operations.6 The result has been different
reform movements based on common principles such as empowerment and
improving the quality of service to the public.
Within Canada specifically, efforts at reform have reflected changing
public perspectives and concerns. During the 1970's, an increasing number
of rules and regulations were developed to monitor government operations,
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thereby slowing down government processes. These changes reflected the
public's concerns that government information be accessible, that employment
equity be pursued and that government decision-making be 'opened Up'.7
During the 1980's, however, as both the public and public servants
became frustrated by government processes, efforts at reform targeted four
critical areas of concern. The two most important were demands for better
service to the public and increased participation in decision-making. In
addition, pressures associated with adjusting to ne~ technologies and program
limitations resulting from budgetary restrictions necessitated innovative
structural changes within government.8
By the end of the 1980's, the federal government had instituted a massive
initiative to revitalize the federal public service. PS 2000 was announced by
then Prime Minister Mulroney on December 12, 1989, on the premise that the
public sector must be fundamentally changed to "prepare it to deal effectively
with the challenges of the early years of the 21st century. ,,9 The overall
initiative was led by the Clerk of the Privy Council, and each of ten task
forces was led by a deputy minister. The task forces were established to
investigate areas of concern such as staffing and program delivery and to
develop strategies for implementing change within the public sector. While
a determination of the success of PS 2000 in achieving its ambitious goals is
premature, its existence speaks to the urgent nature of the challenges that
13
governments across the country currently face.
In an attempt to explore different organizational forms which might satisfy
or relieve these challenges, PS 2000 and Consulting and Audit Canada
sponsored a Round Table on Alternative Organizational Forms in January,
1992. While there were many different opinions and approaches to public
sector reform in Canada, it was generally agreed that traditional hierarchical
bureaucracies could no longer satisfy the need for a responsive and effective
public service in a complex and constantly changing environment.
Participants also agreed that no universal solution could be applied to all
government organizations due to the diversity of their mandates and that all
organizational change should promote a more effective, efficient and
responsive public service.10
Evidence of the extent of attempts at public sector reform can be gathered
from government submissions to the Institute of Public Administration of
Canada's competition for the Innovative Management Award in both 1990 and
1991. This award is similar to the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality
Award given by the U.S. government. 11 The first-ever competition in
Canada was held in 1990, and while the contest organizers expected to receive
only 15 to 20 submissions, they received 57 entries from across the
country.12 By 1993 the number of entries to the competition had increased
to more than 120 submissions.
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Entries elaborated on various types of public service innovation, ranging
from 'turn arounds', a process of change which affects all aspects of an
organization in trouble, to job sharing and the utilization of new technology.
Partnerships with the private sector, other governments and departments within
the same government, made a strong appearance In this competition,
representing 21 of the 57 entries.13 The following year, partnership
management was the theme of the IPAC competition, and 103 government
agencies submitted profiles of their most successful partnership arrangements.
The federal government's PS 2000 initiative has been mirrored by a
variety of provincial initiatives. For example, the government of British
Columbia launched Service Quality B.C. in September, 1990. This program
promotes customer service and quality management within the British
Columbia public service.14 Ten steps to delivering excellence in quality and
service were identified and ministries were encouraged to build on success
stories within their ministry, which they called 'islands of excellence'.15
Similarly, the Ontario government released Best Value for Tax Dollars in
February, 1992. This document explores the pursuit of improved service
quality by identifying service quality 'gaps' within the Ontario public service
and outlining strategies to close these gaps. Paramount to this examination
is the ability of the government to provide better service with fewer resources.
Research for the Ontario Customer Service Task Force indicated that
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while the public ranked the service of the Ontario Government higher than
that of the federal government, it was also ranked lower than Canada Post,
municipal governments and various private sector organizations. In addition,
only 23 percent of the public felt that service is improving.16 Researchers
identified a number of barriers to providing good service, such as lack of staff
and prolonged approval processes, which have resulted in discrepancies, or
'gaps', between customer expectations and satisfaction with public sector
performance. The task force made a number of recommendations to close
these 'gaps' which included the establishment of partnerships to improve
service, reduce waste, and deploy resources in a manner which will reap the
greatest results.17
A commitment to management strategies such as partnerships reflects the
government's perception that the public is not satisfied with government
services as well as the political, social and economic environment within
which government must function. A statement by Brian Burke, Premier of
Western Australia, applies equally well to Canada;
"Government must now respond to a public which, although it demands
new services, has made it clear that it will not accept tax increases.u18
The major questions examined in this thesis are: Do partnerships work? and
What price must our system of government pay for their success?
16
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Chapter Two
PUBLIC PARTNERSHIP IN ONTARIO: AN OVERVIEW
Within the private sector, the practice of joining forces with other
organizations in partnership arrangements is not new. Often referred to as
strategic alliances or joint ventures, these arrangements are considered to
enhance the competitive strength of an organization. While their proliferation
within the public sector is more limited, the concept and use of public
partnership have grown steadily in recent years.
The first component of this chapter will explain the concept of partnership
and provide working definitions for use in this thesis. An overview of the
various types of partnership will provide a foundation for further analysis of
specific partnership agreements. The concept of a partnership continuum will
be introduced and the difficulties associated with attempts to categorize
specific agreements will be discussed.
The second component of chapter two will deal specifically with the
approach to partnership taken by the OMNR. The policy environment within
which partnerships exist in that Ministry will be outlined. Lastly, this chapter
will provide a brief summary of the overall status of partnership agreements
within the OMNR by examining the results of the District survey as outlined
in chapter one.
19
PARTNERSHIP: CONCEPT AND DEFINITION
'Partnership', 'empowerment', 'service'; these words can be used to describe
innovations in government and public sector management in the 1990's.
'Partnership', specifically, has become one of the "buzzwords of the decade,
appearing in a range of government documents, including budget speeches and
strategic policy documents. For example, the Science Council of Canada has
asserted that only partnership with business, labour and educational and
research institutions combined with a decentralization of decision-making will
ensure Canada's scientific and technological success.! Similarly, the PS 2000
Task Force on Workforce Adaptiveness recognized that partnerships and
coalitions are necessary to explore differing perspectives and use scarce
resources effectively.2 Within Ontario, Premier Bob Rae stressed these new
associations when he pledged to "govern with a sense of partnership, a
partnership that includes those who were neglected or left out in the past. ,,3
Despite the common usage of the term 'partnership', it often appears that
there is not a common understanding of what the term implies. 'Partnership'
has been used to describe new and innovative arrangements which
significantly alter the power structures within government, as well as pre-
existing and very limited arrangements such as the contracting out of
government operations.
20
In the strictest sense, 'partnership' implies a sharing of power and the
existence of collaborative action. However, the extent to which power is
actually shared varies greatly from one partnership to another. The presence
of an ongoing commitment, and shared contributions, needs and benefits,
differentiates 'partnerships' from other more temporary arrangements.4 For
the purpose of this thesis, partnership will be defined as "a relationship
involving the sharing of power, work, support andior information with others
for the achievement of joint goals and/or mutual benefits. "S It has been
suggested that true partnerships are based on relatively equitable power
relationships between the partners. At the very least, there must be a
willingness to acknowledge the contribution of each partner and the validity
of their interests.
The concept of power is fundamental to partnerships. True partnerships
promote empowerment by sharing decision-making power in either the
planning or implementation stage of an agreement. However, merely
devolving some authority does not ensure a partnership's success. If
management's attitude is that this power is a 'gift' which may be given and
taken away at its discretion, the foundation for the agreement will be eroded.6
Partnerships must, therefore, be based on a genuine commitment to involve
others in the decision-making process.
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Government partnerships serve a variety of purposes, often depending on
who is participating in the arrangement. For example, partnerships with
organizations which serve a public purpose, such as non-profit organizations,
usually focus on increasing government responsiveness in policy development
or program delivery. Alternatively, partnerships with private sector
organizations often promote more efficient program delivery or encourage
technological innovation and sometimes require control measures such as
formal contracts to accommodate differing goals among the partners.7
Within the private sector, large corporations have increasingly relied on
partnerships for more than a decade. Companies such as Kodak and Apple,
in pursuit of management strategies which focus on 'doing more with less',
have developed alliances with suppliers, customers and venture partners.8
Partnerships involving the public sector, however, have been more limited.
Governments have often confused 'partnership' with 'consultation'-- soliciting
public input only to proceed along pre-determined paths. In a recent
presentation to public servants, a Deputy Minister of the Ontario Ministry of
Community and Social Services stated that government commitments to
partnership agreements have often been cosmetic or chimerical responses to
"polls and news reports about unresponsive government".9 Despite such
opinions, partnerships have become a strategic approach to developing,
delivering and managing public programs.
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Within the Ontario government, partnership development has taken a
particularly high-profile position as a major component of the Premier's
Councils' mandate. This mandate is intended to ensure that long-term
planning and policy development become more democratic by fostering
expanded public participation.10 Also within Ontario, an inter-ministerial
partnership network has been established to assist ministries in implementing
'partnership' by providing a forum for exploring policy development and
service development initiatives based on the principles of partnership and
cooperation.11 At the present time, this network consists of 40 members
from 25 different ministries and central agencies.
The Ontario Ministry of Education and Training recently published a
package of partnership profiles with business, unIons, community
organizations and other educational institutions. This collection of thirty-nine
profiles is intended as evidence that Ontario's colleges and universities are
working on a collaborative basis with other organizations to resolve problems
and meet the demand for knowledge and skills required in today's
economy.12 This ministry has also established a Partnership Development
Branch whose mandate is to pursue these agreements proactively.
Despite the increasing emphasis on partnerships as a strategic or policy
tool, they cannot be considered a panacea for organizations striving for
innovation. Independent studies of partnership agreements within the private
23
sector indicate that approximately 70 percent of joint ventures are disbanded
or do not meet partner expectations.13 Partnerships remain very fragile
entities whose establishment and maintenance require great care and planning.
The motivations for entering into partnerships are as varied as the
partnerships themselves. Within the private sector, the primary justifications
for cooperative alliances include limited resources, flexible access to other
resources or markets, and economies of scale.14 'Similarly, the motivations
for establishing partnership agreements within the public sector include those
based on resources such as achieving 'more with less', accessing outside
infrastructures to enhance program delivery, and providing better leverage for
tax dollars. 15
Public sector partnerships are also viewed as a means of providing better
service to the public. Studies completed in 1990 indicated that less than one-
half of Canadians surveyed felt the federal government was as committed as
the private sector to providing good quality servi.ce. While provincial and
municipal governments were rated slightly higher than the federal government,
the general level of satisfaction with government performance was low.16
Partnerships allow the government to provide goods and services in a more
responsive, efficient and effective manner.
Partnerships between the government and other organizations can also
reflect an ideological position that supports increased public participation in
24
decision-making. In a world in which governments are constantly attempting
to resolve complex issues such as poverty, dwindling resources and
environmental destruction, unilateral decision-making has become not only
unpalatable to many citizens, but also impractical. Partnerships recognize the
need to increase consultation and public participation by facilitating coalitions
representing the various issues and interests which exist.17
Regardless of the motivation, the increased application of partnership in
government appears inevitable. Not only has the private sector recognized the
potential benefits of these alliances, but the public sector acknowledges their
value as well. In addition, the public is demanding a greater level of
involvement in areas which have previously been the domain of either
politicians or public servants.
Partnerships have been defined In a number of ways. For example,
Kanter has divided private sector partnerships into three categories which
include multi-organizational service alliances, opportunistic alliances and
stakeholder alliances. These categories are based primarily on the
composition of the alliance membership as well as the purpose of the alliance
itself.18 Other analysts use criteria such as a co.mbination of membership
composition and operation of the agreement to define partnership
categories.19
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Regardless of the criteria used to categorize partnerships, scholars
generally agree that 'true' partnerships promote empowerment by sharing
decision-making power. For the purpose of this thesis, therefore, category
definitions will be based on the partnership purpose and the nature and extent
to which power is exercised by the partners. Power is a relational concept
which can be used to describe a variety of relationships including those which
exist between partners. Power is defined here as "the capacity of an
individual, or group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals
or groups in the manner in which he desires, and to prevent his own being
modified in a manner which he does not. ,,20 This power may be manifested
in the ability to control or direct others, or the ability to influence others
informally by such means as suggestion, persuasion, or intimidation. Control·
is exercised by virtue of formal authority, while influence may result from the
authority of expertise or the ability to reward or punish others in some way.21
Power, in the sense of influence, is of particular importance when
examining partnerships as these arrangements often consist of partners from
a variety of different organizations who may not possess any direct,
hierarchical control over each other. In order that non-governmental partners
may be empowered, therefore, they must be able to influence the decisions
and actions of government. Four categories of partnerships which utilize this
concept of power have been developed and while they cannot provide
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watertight compartments into which all partnerships will fall, they do provide
a useful tool for evaluating and comparing general partnership types.
Collaborative partnerships may be defined as partnerships in which each
partner exercises real power, in the sense of either control or influence, in the
decision-making process. This type of agreement best represents 'true' or
ideal partnerships. Decisions are, whenever possible, made by building a
consensus and partners are, to various extents, mutually dependent. Because
of the collaborative nature of these partnerships there is usually a pooling of
resources such as money, information and labour. Typically, the government
or public organization surrenders some power to the other partners, either by
refraining from exercising direct control or by delegating formal authority to
one or more partners.22 Co-management boards are one example of this
type of agreement.23
While collaborative partnerships are 'true' partnerships in terms of power
sharing, their presence within the public sector appears to be limited. This
may be a result of the inherent conflicts between p"artnership and some of the
values which guide public sector management in Canada. The challenge to
government is to maintain values such as consistency, fairness, prudence,
probity and ministerial responsibility while pursuing innovative management
approaches.24 Partnerships offer the flexibility that is sometimes needed to
deal with complex issues and to respond to client needs, but the scope of
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innovation may be limited by the very nature of public business.
Collaborative partnerships in which power is actually shared or delegated may
directly affect the maintenance of these values and traditions. It is possible,
however, that the number of truly collaborative government partnerships
within Canada may increase as the public continues to demand greater
involvement in decision-making.
Unlike collaborative partnerships, consultative partnerships do not involve
a direct sharing of decision-making power. Rather, these partnerships provide
a forum for soliciting advice from individuals, groups and organizations
outside of government. Control is retained by the government; however, the
partners exercise influence on government decisions. The degree of influence
depends on factors such as the degree of formalization associated with the
arrangement, the extent of public interest in the issue, the credibility of the
partners and whether the results of the partnership are made public.25
Consultative partnerships often take the form of advisory councils. While
some theorists feel these consultative arrangements do not represent real
partnerships at all, due to the advisory nature of the arrangements, they often
evolve to become more collaborative with responsibility for specific policy
areas being delegated to members of the partnership.26
Operational partnerships are those partnerships in which work of a
physical or non-physical nature is shared to achieve common or compatible
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goals. This type of partnership sometimes involves the sharing of resources,
such as funding, to achieve these goals.27 Power is usually retained by the
government or public organization but the partners can often exercise a degree
of influence by virtue of their operational involvement. This type of
partnership is common within the public sector and often focuses on
improving the efficiency or responsiveness of program delivery.
In contributory partnerships, a public or private organization agrees to
provide sponsorship or material support for an activity in which it will have
no operational involvement.28 These partnerships do not include any ongoing
involvement by the non-governmental partners in either decision-making or
operation and are, therefore, unlikely to disperse or alter the power-sharing
relationship in any way. Partnerships have been defined in a variety of ways;
however, most scholars agree that 'true' partnerships promote empowerment
by sharing decision-making power. For this reason, it was decided early on
in the research for this thesis that the questions being considered did not apply
to this type of arrangement.
In light of the complex and diverse nature of government activities and
of stakeholder involvement in these activities, it is apparent that attempts to
apply 'quick fixes' or generic solutions to public sector problems will not be
successful. Rather, public servants must develop 'tailor-made' solutions that
address the unique circumstances which they face. 29 As a result, the extent,
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nature and type of partnerships which are developed within the public sector
vary greatly. It is inherently difficult, therefore, to classify partnership
agreements against preexisting criteria. Partnerships may not only satisfy the
criteria for more than one category, but they may also evolve from one
category to another as the partnership progresses.
The concept of a partnership continuum may be a useful tool when
considering partnership agreements. Since 'power' is fundamental to the
nature of these agreements, a partnership continuum based on the degree of
power exercised by non-governmental partners, or retained by government,
may alleviate problems associated with overlapping categories. Contributory
partnerships, or agreements in which no power is shared, would appear at one
end of the continuum while truly collaborative partnerships would appear at
the other end of the continuum. Partnerships in which there is an operational
or an advisory function, or both, would appear on the continuum based solely
on the extent and nature of power-sharing associated with that particular
agreement.
A partnership continuum illustrates that while one type of partnership may
generally result in greater levels of power-sharing than another, this will not
always be the case. For example, certain types of operational agreements may
result in far greater power being exercised by non-governmental partners than
typical consultative partnerships. While partnerships can be evaluated on a
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sliding scale in theory, for practical purposes it is necessary to classify
partnerships into groups so that comparisons and generalizations may be
made.
PARTNERSHIP AND THE OMNR
"MNR will not only support and facilitate partnerships, but will actively
seek them out. The ministry will look for greater involvement from
other public agencies, citizens' organizations, aboriginal peoples,
businesses, labour unions and individuals who may wish to assist the
ministry with program delivery or become directly involved in resource
planning and management.
The concept of partnership advanced here, however, goes beyond
work-sharing to one ofshared decision-ma~ing in resource policy and
planning. ,,30
The preceding quotation was taken from the OMNR policy and strategy
document for the 1990's. Within this document the OMNR outlines its new
policy of 'sustainable development' as well as supporting strategies for the
achievement of this policy. Partnership in resource management is one of
three supporting strategies which this Ministry intends to utilize to ensure that
the public shares in both the benefits and responsibilities of resource
stewardship.
Partnership is not new to the OMNR. As early ·as the 1940's, this ministry
was establishing partnership agreements with outside agencies. Often called
working relationships, these agreements were born of necessity. The very
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nature of OMNR business and the geographic dispersion of its offices often
necessitated innovative management tools such as partnership. For example,
an OMNR partnership with municipalities in the early 1950's resulted in the
creation of conservation authorities and this has been, by far, the most
collaborative partnership into which this Ministry has entered. These
conservation authorities have formal responsibility for floodplain and
watershed management, including decision-making authority for planning,
program direction and 0.perations. 31
The current thrust towards partnership within the OMNR is viewed as a
way of managing public money and public resources while attempting to
achieve full consultation with and the consensus of the public. According to
the current Assistant Deputy Minister of Operations, the major objectives of
partnerships in this ministry include allowing greater public participation in
decision-making and changing the orientation of resource management from
a 'big brother' approach to one which encourages public involvement, thereby
becoming more acceptable to clients.32
To this end, the OMNR established a Partnership Task Force in 1990.
The mandate of this task force was to develop a policy framework within
which partnerships would be established and to identify corporate issues which
may arise as a result. The final report of the task force which was presented
to the Ministry's Executive Committee in April, 1992, includes a partnership
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policy framework, several individual policies, an update of corporate issues,
and an implementation strategy.
While the task force report acknowledges that the ultimate question
relating to partnership development is "How far should power-sharing go?",
it states that resolution of this issue can only be achieved once other major
policy initiatives such as native self-government progress further. It is hoped
that these initiatives will provide the foundation and the experience for
establishing an 'ends policy' for partnership develqpment.
The OMNR defines partnerships as any "relationship involving sharing
with people and organizations for the achievement of mutual and/or
compatible objectives" and specifies that benefits and costs as well as the
associated risks and accountability must be shared. 33 The task force
identified a number of principles which were intended to ensure that the
OMNR's integrity and position within a partnership would not be jeopardized.
Such principles as compatibility with OMNR interests, mutual benefits/risks,
equality of access to the partnership by all members of the public, and control,
by way of accountability mechanisms, assist the public servant when
establishing or participating in a partnership agreement. In addition, a
checklist of questions dealing with a variety of partnership issues such as
financial arrangements and administration was developed.
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Although the task force recommended the development and
implementation of education and training programs in partnership management
as well as the establishment of a partnership communications strategy, neither
of these has been initiated. Ministry staff state that these initiatives have been
postponed pending the integration of the task force with a Service-Quality
Committee which was established in 1991. This integration will reflect the
use of partnerships as one mechanism for addressing the management of
relationships when service-quality initiatives are pursued. It is hoped that
partnership policy will eventually fit into the service-quality framework
currently being developed by the Service-Quality Committee. 34
In 1992 the OMNR won the Institute of Public. Administration of Canada
Award for Innovative Management, competing against 102 other entries. The
submission included fourteen high-profile partnerships from the various
districts within Ontario. Despite the fact that the Ministry's strategy statement
advances the concept of shared decision-making in partnerships, no
collaborative partnership was submitted to the IPAC competition. Ministry
staff explain that there are very few of this type of partnership from which to
draw a submission.35
It is estimated by this author that there are presently close to one thousand
partnership agreements between the OMNR and individuals or organizations
outside the government. Many of these partnerships are simple agreements
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between the Ministry and a single landowner for the purpose of completing
some operation on private property. While there is no comprehensive
inventory of these agreements, various OMNR staff have attempted to collect
data on partnerships within their jurisdiction. In addition, many of the
OMNR's partnerships are centrally conceived programs, such as the
Community Fisheries Involvement Program (CFIP), which are implemented
at the District level but coordinated at main office. CFIP is a management
program which involves the joint action of the OMNR and members of the
public in tackling assorted fisheries and habitat projects. Established in 1982,
the program has grown steadily and in 1990 approximately 250 CFIP projects
were approved across the province.36
Without an inventory it is impossible to determine accurately the
proportion of OMNR partnerships falling into each category. Ministry staff
estimate, however, that consultative and operationai partnerships each account
for 45 percent of the Ministry's partnership agreements while collaborative and
contributory partnerships each account for only five percent.
The lack of educational and training programs on partnership management
was evident in the results of the District survey. More than 25 percent of the
partnerships submitted were improperly classified by Ministry staff.
Moreover, a number of Districts considered employment agreements, such as
contracting out, to be operational partnerships. Employment agreements were
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eliminated from the survey data and the remaInIng submissions were
reclassified where necessary.
OMNR staff appeared to have a sound understanding of the difference
between consultative and operational partnerships; however, they were unclear
regarding what constituted true power-sharing. In addition, there were a
number of problems associated with the definition for contributory
partnerships which was used in the survey. The contribution of labour
resources in a partnership seemed to suggest some operational involvement on
the part of the partners. As a result, the definition was modified to reflect
contributions of a financial or material nature only.
Of the 33 Districts and lakes surveyed, 30 responses were received,
resulting in a response rate of approximately 91 percent.(Appendix E) Only
42 percent of the submissions included examples of all three partnership types
being considered in this thesis. This cannot be construed, however, to
represent the lack of a particular type of partnership within a District as it may
reflect a lack of understanding of the various categories and criteria.
Approximately 60 percent of the collaborative partnerships submitted by
the Districts were established between the OMNR and no more than three
partners. Forest Management Agreements (FMA) between the OMNR and
forestry companies and agreements with native groups accounted for almost
one-third of this type of partnership. The majority of the remainder were
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agreements in which the objectives were focused on a specific management
area.
All the consultative partnerships submitted, on the other hand, consisted
of more than four partners. The format of these partnerships was usually an
advisory or citizens committee. Objectives were broad in nature and the
jurisdiction of the partnership was often a large management area such as an
entire District.
Operational partnerships were almost evenly divided among groups
consisting of more than four partners and those comprised of fewer than four
partners. International agreements made an appearance within this category,
usually focusing on U.S.-Canada joint habitat rehabilitation ventures. All of
the operational agreements had fairly specific objectives which provided for
measurable results. Many Districts confused arrangements in which an
OMNR operation was contracted out with truly operational partnerships in
which an ongoing relationship between the partners existed and both the risks
and benefits were shared.
Only 32 percent of the Districts surveyed submitted examples of
contributory partnerships. This was due, in part, to the confusion associated
with the category definition. As a result, changes were made to the criteria
associated with the definition itself. In addition, the concept of 'sponsorship'
is fairly new within this Ministry and few of these agreements exist. Of the
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agreements submitted, almost 75 percent consisted of fewer than four partners
and most had very narrow objectives, allowing for the completion of a
specific program of operation.
While partnership agreements within other government organizations may
be different in both orientation and scope than those within the OMNR, it is
likely that some of the tendencies indicated within this Ministry can be
observed elsewhere. In light of the nature of public sector business and the
constraints which may limit management techniques within this sector, it is
probable that truly collaborative partnerships are no more common within
other government organizations than they are within the OMNR. The concept
of sharing power with the public may not be new to Canadian government;
however, practical attempts to do so by utilizing collaborative agreements are
fairly recent. Moreover, the potential implications of such power-sharing are
sufficient to discourage or restrict the degree to which governments embrace
the practice.
To the extent that collaborative partnerships do exist within the public
sector, it is reasonable to expect that for logistical purposes these agreements
exist between small numbers of partners and that their objectives, at least
initially, are specific in nature. Similarly, the technical nature of operational
agreements seems to suggest that these partnerships exhibit a narrow focus
oriented towards a specific program or operation. Lastly, the fact that most
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consultative partnerships take the form of advisory or citizens' committees
implies a larger number of partners and a broade~ scope of operation. It is
also likely that those partnerships which do attempt to alter the power
relationship between government and the public will be more formalized than
those based on a more traditional structure.
The partnership agreements submitted by the OMNR were varied in nature
and scope. Despite this variety, they illustrated a number of trends in
partnership development and displayed a commitment within that Ministry to
move from a paternalistic approach to governing to one in which government
functions in partnership with the public. What has yet to be determined is the
extent to which partnerships established by the OMNR have been successful
in making this change. The next three chapters of this thesis will examine six
specific partnership agreements within the OMNR and will provide a
foundation for answering this question.
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Chapter Three
COLLABORATIVE PARTNERSHIPS
Collaborative partnerships, that is, partnerships in which power-sharing
exists, best satisfy the criteria for 'real' partnership. These partnerships are
characterized by consensual decision-making by participants who are
mutually dependent to some degree. A typical collaborative arrangement
requires that each partner relinquish some autonomy. Usually, the public
organization either refrains from exercising control of the other partners or
actually delegates this control.! Regardless of the approach taken, the
partnership must be established with a genuine intent to power share.
Within the OMNR, very few truly collaborative partnerships exist despite
the Ministry's claim that it advances partnerships in which decision-making
in resource policy and planning is shared.2 While OMNR staff estimate that
approximately five percent of their partnership agreements are collaborative,
on examination of those agreements submitted in response to the district
survey, many of the 'collaborative' partnerships were found to be consultative
in nature with no direct sharing of power involved. Inaccurate assessments
of the proportion of each type of partnership may be the result of a lack of
understanding by OMNR staff regarding what constitutes real power sharing
or of differing opinions on the extent to which partners can influence
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decision-making.
This chapter will provide descriptive analysis of the establishment,
structure and operation of the Algonquin Forestry Authority in Algonquin
Park, and the Tupper/Shields Co-operative Management Committee in Sault
Ste. Marie, Ontario. The Algonquin Forestry Authority provides an example
of a truly collaborative partnership while the Tupper/Shields Co-operative
Management Committee illustrates a partnership which, despite its stated
intention of functioning as a full partner, has not met the criteria associated
with collaborative partnerships. Its inclusion in this chapter is based on the
premise that it is representative of the types of partnership arrangements
which are often considered by government, albeit erroneously, to be
collaborative in nature. While the political implications, success factors and
limitations of these partnerships will be discussed further in chapters 6 and
7, this chapter will discuss the appropriateness of category definitions as well
as present general observations regarding the government's approach to these
arrangements.
THE ALGONQUIN FORESTRY AUTHORITY
The Algonquin Forestry Authority (AFA) is no ordinary partnership.
Established in 1975 to oversee logging and conduct forest harvesting within
the boundaries of Algonquin Park, it functions as a Crown Agency. The
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partnership is unique in that, while the government has formally delegated
some of its powers to the authority, it has chosen to do so within the confines
of the Crown Agency Act, thereby maintaining an arm's length relationship
with the newly created body.
History
Approximately 65 million people live within a one-day drive of
Algonquin Park. Established in 1893 under the Algonquin National Park Act,
the Park was intended to preserve the headwaters of key watersheds in the
province, to conserve the native forest, fish and wildlife, and to provide an
area for both forestry and recreation.3 Classified as a Natural Environment
Park under the Provincial Parks Classification System, Algonquin Park is one
of only two natural environment parks in Ontario to be zoned for both
recreation and utilization.4
The provision of the Park for multi-use in the Algonquin National Park
Act was the foundation for years of conflict between the various user groups.
Forest operations were conducted within the Park boundaries as early as the
1830's, prior to the recognition of logging as a valid and continuing function
of the Park in 1893.5 The identification of recreation as a primary purpose
of the park, however, reflected the foresight of the Royal Commission on
Forest Reservation and National Parks in 1892. The Commission
recommended that a portion of ungranted crown land be set apart for park use
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as well as a forest reservation.6
The Park, located 120 miles north of Lake Ontario, covers a geographic
area of approximately 2,900 square miles. Approximately twenty percent of
Canada's export dollars are earned by the forest industry, and almost one-
third of that is earned in Ontario. Algonquin Park provides the majority of
the wood from central Ontario.7 Clearly, the forest industry within the Park
makes a substantial contribution to both the local and provincial economies.
Statistics indicating the extent of this contribution, however, have varied over
the years. The most recent statistics available indicate that the direct
contribution of both Algonquin Park logging and related primary
manufacturing to the provincial economy was $69.5 million in 1987 dollars. 8
Algonquin Park is also significant in that it was the first provincial park
established in Ontario and, as such, often provides a model for park
management and policy development within the province. In addition, its
proximity to Toronto enables large numbers of people (700,000 annually in
1972) to utilize the Park for recreational purposes. As a result, conflicts
between advocates of forest harvesting within the Park and conservationists
have been continuous.
These conflicts escalated during the late 1960's as ecologists and
environmentalists noted the impact of logging operations on parks such as
Lake Superior Provincial Park and Quetico Provincial Park in Ontario.
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Delegations from the Algonquin Wildlands League, an environmental lobby
group based in Toronto, toured such parks and released news bulletins in a
variety of major papers across the province regarding the declining state of
the province's park lands.
In December, 1969, CBC Television Network aired a special edition of
the television series "The Land of Ours". The edition, entitled "No Man's
Land", dealt with the forces and pressures which can destroy a park.
Algonquin Provincial Park provided an illustration of what can result from
a 'multi-use' designation. The two main threats to the park were alleged to
be forest harvesting and over-use by recreationists. 9
As public attention focused on Algonquin Park, the intensity of the
debate regarding the future of logging within the park increased. Rene
Brunelle, then Minister of Lands and Forests, was accused of gross
mismanagement of the park by members of the Algonquin Wildlands
League.10 At the same time, government supporters stated publicly that any
proposal to impose stricter regulations on timber harvesting within the park
would result in the most significant economic setback in the area's history. 11
Logging operations within the park were fraught with utilization and
distribution problems. Eighteen different companies possessed timber
licences which provided them with exclusive logging rights to various
portions of park land. Each company conducted its own planning regarding
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roads and areas for harvest, and each utilized only those products in which
their company specialized. While the Ministry maintained approval authority
for these licences, its administrative boundaries were such that a number of
different administrative units approved the various plans.12
In an attempt to address the issue of long-term planning within the park,
a draft Algonquin Park Master Plan was completed in 1968 by ministry staff
under the leadership of the park superintendent. Public input was solicited
during public hearings and open houses held in the park area and in Toronto.
The plan proposed the designation of a small "primitive" area within the park
which would be protected from all forest harvesting and the imposition of
tough restrictions on logging companies.13
Following the release of the draft master plan, the Algonquin Park
Advisory Committee was established in 1969 to advise the government on
policy recommendations and alternatives presented in the proposed plan. It
was hoped that this advice would lead to the completion of a final master
plan for the park by 1975. A task force was also established to conduct
economic impact studies relating to the recommendations and approximately
40 background papers were presented to the advisory committee. Between
1970 and 1972 the advisory committee submitted to the Minister 36
recommendations which formed the basis of the Master Plan completed in
1975. These recommendations supported the multi-use designation of the
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park and reinforced the significance of the park to both the economic base
and the recreational needs of the local area and the province.14
The composition of the advisory committee was broadly based,
incorporating such representatives as the Algonquin Wildlands League,
camping and conservation associations and local and provincial politicians.
The Wildlands League, by far the most vocal group opposing logging within
the park, resigned from the committee in 1970 citing as the reason frustration
with a government and a process which was clearly oriented towards timber
management.IS
While the advisory committee completed its work, lobbying for and
against forest harvesting in the park continued. Former premier of Ontario,
Leslie Frost, sat as chairperson of the committee and during discussions with
the press stated that the committee must strike a balance between the interests
of lumbermen, recreationists and conservationists.16 Meanwhile, members
of the Algonquin Wildlands League pointed out that Mr. Frost was also a
director of Eddy Forest Products Ltd., implying that this position must
influence his ability to view the issue of land use objectively.l?
In October, 1971, a deleg!1tion of senior forest industry officials made a
presentation to the then Premier of Ontario, William Davis, and to Rene
Brunelle. During this presentation, the Premier was warned that unless
government restrictions on timber harvest operations within the park were
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eased, between 3,000 and 4,000 people in the province could lose their jobs.
According to the president of the Ontario Forest Industries Association, the
forest industry was encountering serious problems due to U.S. import duties
and increasing restrictions on its operations. 18
In 1972 the advisory committee was reestablished with expanded terms
of reference allowing it to review management and ecological problems
within the park in greater detail. Leslie Frost was again appointed
chairperson for the committee and all members except one remained the
same. At approximately the same time, researchers associated with the
Faculty of Forestry at the University of Toronto released the results of a
forest industry attitudes survey in which operators within the park were
surveyed. Based on industry responses, the researchers determined that most
officials within the industry felt that ongoing communication with government
and participation in government policy formulation enabled them to
substantially influence government policy.19
Partnership Creation
In July, 1973, then Natural Resources Minister, Leo Bernier, announced
the Ministry's intention to create the Algonquin Forestry Authority (AFA) in
accordance with recommendations made by the Algonquin Park Advisory
Committee. The AFA was to be established by an act of the Legislature as
a crown corporation responsible for undertaking land management and forest
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harvesting in the park. The new Authority would replace the operations
being carried out by eighteen separate operators.20
In October, 1974, Bernier tabled in the Legislature the Algonquin Park
Master Plan. Shortly thereafter, the Ontario Legislature debated government
Bill 155, "An Act to Incorporate the Algonquin Forestry Authority". During
the debate, the NDP opposition argued that industry could get all the wood
it needed from sources outside the park. The Liberal opposition criticized the
government's forest management claiming that better management would have
allowed a decrease in logging within the park.· Despite opposition, the
Progressive Conservative majority passed the bill by a 36 to 22 vote on
December 10, 1974.21 The government also established an Ontario
Provincial Parks Council whose mandate is to monitor the province's parks
as well as the AFA's success in implementing the Master Plan.
Dr. Vidar Nordin, Dean of the Faculty of Forestry at the University of
Toronto, was appointed as Chairperson of the newly created AFA by Natural
Resources Minister Bernier within one week of Bill 155 receiving Royal
Assent. In addition, Bernier announced the membership of the Authority's
Board of Directors, composed primarily of high-profile individuals in the
forest industry and politicians with some representation from citizen groups.
Dr. Nordin named I.D. Bird, a forester working for a private forestry
company in Quebec, as general manager of the Authority in March, 1975 and
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announced that the Town of Huntsville would be the location of the AFA
headquarters.22
The government of Ontario provided the new Authority with an initial
start up grant of $600,000 which has since been paid back. A line of credit
was also established between the AFA and the province which allows the
AFA to borrow funds for operational purposes, which must be repaid with
interest each year.23
In general, members of the forest industry perceived the new approach
to the management of Algonquin Park as a workable compromise which
allowed all users of the Park to co-exist. Not all industry representatives
agreed with this assessment, however, as concerns developed regarding the
impact that government involvement would have on the cost of wood to the
industry. Moreover, some loggers felt that the AFA signalled an overall
Increase in government involvement in forestry within the province.
Conservationists claimed that while the Master Plan contained some positive
changes, the Act allocated far too little of the Park to public and recreational
use.24
Partnership Operation
The Algonquin Forestry Authority Act of 1974 establishes the AFA as
a Crown Corporation responsible for land management and forest harvesting
within the park. It does so by a) zoning the park into a number of areas,
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some exclusively for recreation and others for both recreation and logging,
and b) putting the administration of the logging under a specially created
corporation. The AFA harvests forest products and supplies them to
industries dependent upon the forest resources of the park. Much of the
actual harvesting is carried out under contract with local companies. The
Authority must conduct all its operations in conformity with the Algonquin
Park Master Plan which attempts to balance the interest of the public.
The context within which the AFA performs these operations is complex
and has been evolving since its conception. The Master Plan functions as the
umbrella under which all resource issues must fall. This document considers
all uses, including recreational, hunting, trapping, and logging, and sets the
parameters within which all management documents must be developed. It
is reviewed every five years by the Provincial Parks Council and
recommendations for changes are made to the Minister.
Specific management direction regarding forestry is then provided within
a Forest Management Plan which was completed by the Authority in 1979.
The current plan is valid until the year 2000 although it is reviewed every
five years by the AFA. Ultimate approval authority for this document also
rests with the Minister.
While the Master Plan and the Forest Management Plan provide
guidelines and parameters for land management within the park, the
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conveyance to the Authority of the responsibility ·for planning, management
and execution of forest management on the ground is contained in a Forest
Management Undertaking (FMU). This document sets out the terms and
conditions of the AFA's responsibilities, including such issues as funding
sources and reporting systems. The FMU is reviewed every five years by the
AFA and approved by the Minister.
More precise detail in terms of where, when and how forest management
will be completed is provided within a Timber Management Plan (TMP).
The TMP is prepared by the Authority in accordance with a Timber
Management Planning Manual for Crown Lands in Ontario and involves
fairly extensive public input. The TMP provides both a long-term (20 year)
framework and short-term(5 year) detail. It requires that the Authority
prepare annual operating plans which are approved by the Board of Directors
of the AFA and the District Office of the OMNR.
Initially, the Board of Directors of the AFA was comprised of ten
members including the chairperson. Volunteers were not publicly solicited;
rather they were handpicked by the Premier. Criteria for selection of the
original Board appear to be scientific or business expertise. Through the
years, however, greater emphasis has been placed on representation and while
there are no designated representatives from various stakeholder groups, the
current board appears to reflect a consideration of geographic, gender and
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native issues. Environmental interests are not formally represented.
Appointments, which are usually for two or three years, have recently been
advertised and selection of the candidates continues to be at the discretion of
the Premier.25
The Authority itself is comprised of a General Manager and a staff of
approximately twenty employees, including foresters, technicians and other
support staff. The General Manager reports directly to the Board of
Directors, while the Chairperson of the Board reports to the Minister of
Natural Resources. These relationships are specified in the various
documents which convey and direct the AFA's authority. A recent review of
the FMU, completed by an independent consulting firm, found that there was
some confusion and disagreement between the AFA and the OMNR over the
role of the government in supervising and directing the AFA. While there
was disagreement, however, a cooperative working relationship has developed
between the field staff in the two organizations.26
The same review found that there was a high degree of understanding
regarding the ground rules for day-to-day operation among AFA staff.
Differences in accounting procedures have presented occasional difficulties
between the two organizations when expenditure reviews are performed and
recommendations have been made to rectify this situation.27
The Forest Management Undertaking Agreement (FMU) provides three
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funding mechanisms for the Authority's activities; a) retained stumpage or
Crown Dues, b) supplementary funding allocated by the OMNR, alld c)
retained surpluses from previous years. Until recently, the AFA funded core
programs from retained stumpage and applied to the OMNR for funding for
silviculture.28 Recently, the two organizations have developed a rate
schedule for various activities. The AFA provides the OMNR with a
Schedule of Operations for which the OMNR provides block funding over
and above that which can be provided from retained stumpage.29
The Authority performs a variety of functions which could be classified.
as either collaborative, advisory or operational in nature. At the most basic
level, it is responsible for the harvesting and commercial distribution of the
forest resources. In addition, the Authority is responsible for maximizing the
long-term health and value of the forest. In satisfying these roles, the AFA
is involved in advising the OMNR regarding new policies, planning and
decision-making within its area of responsibility. In the early 1980's, the
OMNR formally delegated responsibility for operational silviculture (selection'
and marking of trees for harvest, tree planting, etc.) to the Authority,
relinquishing additional decision-making authority.
The reporting relationships between the AFA General Manager, the Board
of Directors and OMNR further enhance the authority of the AFA by
enabling it to bypass District and Regional government offices should such
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action be considered necessary. In fact, this sidestepping of government
bureaucracy has occurred only occasionally when OMNR and AFA staff have
been unable to reach an agreement on a significant issue. However, AFA
staff feel that the existence of this political avenue for conflict resolution has
resulted in a greater effort by the OMNR to compromise and pursue mutually
agreeable solutions to major problems.30
On average, the level of satisfaction with the new management
arrangement for Algonquin Park has been high among the OMNR, the AFA
and industry. The operational nature of the partnership enables both Board
members and the public to see tangible results. In' addition, quarterly reports
are prepared for the Board and Annual reports which are audited by the
Provincial Auditor are prepared for the OMNR.
Despite general agreement on the success of the partnership, the AFA and
the OMNR continue to disagree on issues such as road construction. Usually
these conflicts are resolved through a process of negotiation. AFA staff
contend that it is sometimes difficult to remain an "honest broker",
maintaining an arm's length from both government and industry, but are
satisfied with their performance in this area despite claims from both sectors
that they are partial to the concerns of the other side.31
While AFA staff expected resistance to their new responsibilities within
the industry, they note that, in fact, government staff resistance has been
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much greater. This resistance often originates with field level staff who had
been performing silviculture activities prior to the AFA assuming
responsibility in this area. Antagonism has also been noted among more
senior government officials who are not in favour of the direct reporting
relationship between the Chairperson of the Authority and the Minister of
Natural Resources.32 Industry representatives have also noted some
resistance to the AFA within the OMNR and feel that as long as the
government maintains the current level of control over the AFA's activities,
forest operations and the industry will continue to be delayed by the 'red tape'
of bureaucracy.33
Senior officials within the OMNR note that, on occaSIon, the public
continues to hold the OMNR responsible for activities performed by the AFA
in which the OMNR had no direct involvement. Furthermore, a small
number of OMNR staff do not feel that the partnership has resulted in a
greater degree of understanding among stakeholder groups regarding opposing
points of view.34
The Algonquin Wildlands League has publicly acknowledged that the
most recent Timber Management Plan developed by the Authority provides
a model for forest management. However, the organization still maintains
that logging activities do not belong within a provincial park setting and that
the government sold out to the forest industry. 35
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In an attempt to promote a positive public attitude regarding its activities
and to mediate continuing criticism by environmental groups, the AFA has
begun to emphasize public relations as a significant component of its work
program. To this end, it is publishing a quarterly newsletter outlining its
initiatives and accomplishments, has developed a video entitled "Maintaining
The Balance", and is involved to a greater degree in community education
programs. In addition, it has just completed a logging museum In
cooperation with the OMNR and an organization called the "Friends of
Algonquin Park". The museum is intended to educate the public about the
origins and significance of logging in Canada.
TUPPER/SHIELDS COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
The Tupper/Shields Co-operative Management Committee is fairly
typical of the types and nature of partnerships within the OMNR which have
been established with the intention of sharing power but which function
merely in an advisory capacity. Unlike other partnerships considered in this
thesis, however, it was established following a fairly brief period of public
concern and attention to the Tupper/Shields Crown Management Unit. The
committee itself consists of a large number of interested stakeholders with
conflicting goals and objectives. Broadly stated, the committee's mandate is
the co-management of natural resources within the Tupper/Shields area by
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proposing, planning and implementing resource management initiatives.
History
The Tupper/Shields Crown Management Unit falls within the jurisdiction
of the Sault Ste. Marie District of the OMNR. The District includes 4,920
square kilometres of land, of which sixty-five percent is crown land. The
forest industry, including logging, paper manufacturing, and saw and veneer
mills, is a major employer in the area. In addition, substantial income is
generated as a result of the tourism industry. 36
A District Land Use Guideline (DLUG) completed in 1983 provides the
framework within which specific resource management plans, such as Timber
Management Plans (TMPs), must operate. The DLUG identifies where, and
in what manner, the OMNR may use Crown land. The original intent of the
OMNR was that the DLUG would be reviewed and updated periodically.
However, staff shortages and a heavy cyclical workload have precluded this
review from occurring. While the DLUG provides guidelines with which
specific resource management plans are expected to comply, the document
has no legal status.
Forestry has been the primary activity within the Tupper/Shields area
since the early 1900's. Forestry companies such as St. Mary's Paper and
Lajambe Forest Products are conveyed the rights to forest resources within
the area in Orders in Councilor Timber Supply Agreements which are
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reviewed and approved by the Provincial Cabinet. Because the
Tupper/Shields area is a Crown unit, the Crown, in this case the OMNR, is
responsible for preparing the Timber Management Plan.37
Recently, a 'soft wilderness' tourism industry has developed within the
Crown unit. The Ontario Ministry of Tourism and Recreation maintains that
mountain bike trails in the area are some of the best in North America.38
Furthermore, there has been continuing pressure for the development of an
all-season recreational facility at Searchmount, a village located within the
Crown unit.39
During the preparation of the 1990-95 TMP in the late 1980's, the
Tupper/Shields area did not generate much public interest or concern.
However, two years later conflicts developed when the previous owners of
Lajambe Forest Products requested the development of a logging road south
of Weckstrom Lake. The TMP did not identify access roads to a particular
area within the unit, and an amendment to the TMP identifying a road
required full public input. A draft map of the proposed road was advertised
in the local papers, resulting in a substantial amount of resistance from a
small group of cottagers and recreationists. The OMNR had failed to realize
that the proposed access road was almost 'on top' of the cottagers' private
road. Moreover, many of the cottagers and some full-time residents in the
area were involved in the recreational industry (e.g. ski trails) and were
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adamantly opposed to any endangerment of the area's wilderness value.
One landowner in particular vocalized concerns about the proposed road
environmental movement, this individual was a participant in provincial-level
land use planning exercises by virtue of her conservationist perspective. To
solicit support and organize the affected landowners, she conducted local
meetings and approached the OMNR as the spokesperson for this group.
In response to this outcry, the OMNR deferred the decision regarding an
access road and shortly thereafter the forestry company was sold. In June
1991, the OMNR held an open house in Searchmount regarding alternative
locations for an access road to the area in question. Public input was varied
and expressed a number of concerns regarding both short-term and long-
term management of the area. In response to a proposal for co-management
of the area from a member of the public present at this meeting, the OMNR
made a commitment to pursue some type of joint management process which
might alleviate the conflicts surrounding forest ma.nagement in the area. The
concept of a co-management committee was developed by the Ministry
within a few months of this open house.
Partnership Creation
Following the development of terms of reference for the committee, the
OMNR began the process of selecting individuals to represent the various
and the forest allocations in the TMP. Actively involved in the
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interests within the Crown unit. The District Manager appointed members
representing a small number of occupations whi~h were not organized and
could not, therefore, formally delegate representation. In addition,
representatives of geographic areas within the Crown unit were approached
individually by OMNR staff and asked to participate in the committee. The
remaining groups or organizations appointed their own representatives.
At the present time, the committee consists of thirteen individuals
including a chairperson. An area supervisor within the OMNR was appointed
chairperson for an initial period of six months, following which the
committee was to select a chairperson from outside the committee structure.
The tourist industry, environmentalists and the forest industry are fairly
evenly represented on the committee. Aside from the chairperson, the
OMNR was to occupy a single seat on the committee. Every attempt to
select an alternative chairperson has resulted in the OMNR staff member
being reinstated in the position.
The terms of reference for the committee were developed by OMNR staff
and presented to the committee for approval during its initial meeting. While
the document was approved by the committee, there were attempts at this
meeting to expand the scope of the committee's· mandate. As no changes
were made to the terms of reference, some committee members continue to
feel that the interests of everyone are not reflected in the document. 40
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Partnership Operation
The Tupper/Shields Co-operative Management Committee is guided by
formal terms of reference which outline the partnership's objectives, the
committee structure, the chairperson's responsibilities and the decision-
making process. Perhaps to accommodate a very divergent group of
individuals, the terms of reference are very general. Broadly stated, the
partnership was established to assist the OMNR to achieve excellence in the
management of natural resources within the Crown unit. There are no
specific goals or timeframes identified.
Despite the fact that the terms of reference identify the committee as a
full partner to the OMNR, no formal authority or responsibility has been
delegated to the committee within the document. Moreover, the terms of
reference specifically state that the OMNR will accept the recommendations
of the committee as advice only and may accept or reject that advice.41
Formal delegation of authority is not a requirement of collaborative
partnerships if substantial influence can be exercised by the partners as a
result of the government refraining from exercising control of the partnership.
However, further discussion of the operation of this arrangement will
illustrate that the OMNR has chosen not to refrain from exercising control of
the partnership and in doing so, limits the ability of the partners to participate
in government decision-making.
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The committee meets once every four or six weeks at the call of the
chairperson. The agenda is set by the OMNR; however, most items for
discussion have been introduced to the committee at a previous meeting.
Discussion is open and informal and while consensus on issues is sought, it
is seldom achieved. Often there is reluctant agreement among members to
a compromise which has been offered by industry or the OMNR. In cases
where no agreement can be reached, recommendations are made to the
District Manager of the OMNR by the Chairperson, but dissenting views are
also expressed.42 As consensual decision-making is fundamental to
collaborative partnerships, it is evident that this particular arrangement cannot
be considered truly collaborative in nature.
Discussion usually revolves around some area of conflict between the
forest industry or the OMNR and the remaining representatives. These
conflicts are frequently sorted out at the table and no recommendations result
from the discussion. However, some committee members note that the
OMNR and industry representatives often pursue issues and reach agreements
outside of the committee process, presenting the outcome of these discussions
to the partners as information only. Partners are, therefore, further denied the
opportunity of exercising influence in the decision-making process. On
occasion, individual representatives have bypassed the committee structure
and approached either the media or the Minister of Natural Resources
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directly. Incidents such as these have resulted in a great deal of animosity
among the members. 43
There appears to be some agreement among participants in the
partnership regarding a commitment to environmental preservation. However,
the extent to which this commitment is translated into either business
activities or the willingness of the members to compromise varies.
Furthermore, the meaning of sustainable development, which is a guiding
principle within the OMNR, differs for most members. As a result, finding
solutions which are satisfactory to all members has been extremely difficult.
None of the committee representatives reports on a regular basis to his
or her respective organizations. In some cases, the representatives are the
senior individuals within the organization and, as such, make decisions within
the partnership with a certain amount of autonomy. These individuals do not
feel that there is anyone in their organizations to whom they should be
reporting.44 Representatives of unorganized areas or industries have no
forum for reporting to the people they represent regarding the committee's
activities. In addition, there is little media coverage regarding the
partnership, making it difficult for representatives of geographic areas to keep
the general public informed. The committee produces no annual reports or
other documentation regarding its activities with the ,exception of the minutes
of committee meetings.
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The extent and nature of the power that each participant brings to the
partnership vary greatly. While the OMNR sits on the committee as a single
member only, its continued involvement in chairing the committee provides
it with an opportunity to control and direct committee activities.
Furthermore, the OMNR is the only organization represented which has
approval authority under various statutes and regulations regarding the issues
which are often presented for discussion. As a result, the OMNR ultimately
retains final decision-making authority regarding most issues. Representatives
of the forest industry also bring substantial influence to the partnership by
virtue of their impact on the economy of the area. The tourism industry,
while not nearly as significant in size as the forest industry, is growing and
promises to employ even greater numbers in the future. The remaining
representatives possess no direct power short of that which stems from their
ability to influence and mobilize the public.
While many participants express a greater understanding of opposing
perspectives as a result of this partnership, this understanding was not
displayed during interviews. Every committee member interviewed expressed
some underlying bias against at least one group participating in the
partnership. Furthermore, representatives of the general public and
unorganized industries such as trapping exhibited a significant lack of
understanding of both the mandate and the planning processes within the
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OMNR.
To date, the committee has initiated only one project of an operational
nature. This project involved planting trees in an area which had been
particularly affected by logging operations. Only the OMNR and the forest
industry participated in the project. Other representatives either felt that this
activity was not within the committee's mandate or that it was the
responsibility of the companies involved to regenerate the area.45
Representatives of unorganized industries and specific geographic areas
had no formal relationship with the OMNR prior to their involvement in the
partnership. However, two of these individuals, also representing
environmental interests, have participated in various planning processes in the
past. Neither of these individuals describes his or her previous relationship
as being adversarial and both feel that the partnership has helped them to
understand government processes better. These individuals also support the
view that their involvement in the partnership has enabled them to critique
government policy from a more knowledgeable position. While they are
pleased to have the opportunity to participate in planning, they are extremely
dissatisfied with the extent to which that participation has resulted in policy
changes at the local level. 'Specifically, they note that this partnership has not
provided a format for dealing with the underlying land use planning issue.46
Industry representatives have been involved in policy planning with
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government for some time and do not feel that this partnership has altered
that relationship in any way_ These individuals also support the belief that
'knowledge is strength', and that involvement in the partnership has allowed
them to criticize government policy in a more informed and constructive
manner. However, they also noted that many people find it difficult to
critique a 'partner' and would not be comfortable functioning as both a partner
and a critic.47
Government representatives note that the committee has met their
performance expectations only because those expectations were low. The
remaining partners, including industry representatives, are unsatisfied with the
committee's performance, its objectives and its structure. While some
decisions are being made more consensually than before by virtue of the
input provided by the committee, the majority of the partners exercise very
little influence on government decision-making. Moreover, significant
conflicts continue to exist and fundamental differences in philosophy make
compromise among stakeholders difficult.48
This chapter has examined two public partnerships which staff of the
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources feel satisfy the criteria associated with
collaborative partnerships. The Algonquin Forestry Authority represents a
truly collaborative partnership in which decision-making authority has been
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formally delegated in supporting legislation to a newly created body. This
partnership, the only one of its kind involving the OMNR, has gradually
increased the nature and extent of power which the Authority possesses and
may represent a change in direction within the government towards real
power-sharing.
The second partnership, the Tupper/Shield Co-operative Management
Committee, is more representative of the type and character of partnerships
which OMNR staff consider to be collaborative. In fact, it is apparent that
this partnership is not collaborative at all considering the lack of power-
sharing which exists as a result of the arrangement. Rather, the structure and
operation of the partnership dictates that it function in a limited advisory
capacity.
The concept of a partnership continuum was introduced in Chapter Two.
Power, or the degree to which power is shared as a result of the partnership,
is fundamental to these agreements, and would form the basis for placement
of a particular arrangement on the continuum. The continuum illustrates that
while one type of partnership may generally result in greater levels of power-
sharing than another, this will not always be the case.
The two partnerships considered in this chapter provide a useful example
of the degree of variance in power-sharing which results from specific
partnership arrangements. The Algonquin Forestry Authority, with its clearly
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defined responsibilities and legal authority, exhibits significant delegated
authority and would appear at one end of the continuum. While the
Tupper/Shields Co-operative Management Committee was established to
function as a full partner, the terms of reference which define its existence
clearly limit its authority and relegate it to the position of advisor.
Furthermore, the ability of the partners to exercise influence on government
decision-making is limited by such factors as the committee structure, and
the extent to which the government has chosen to retain control of the policy
area. As a result, this partnership exhibits far less power-sharing than many
consultative or operational partnerships in which a high degree of influence
results from the arrangement.
It is apparent from this examination that the ability of categories to
represent adequately all types of partnership arrangements is limited. It is
also apparent that merely expressing a desire to power-share is not sufficient
to determine the outcome of a partnership. The intention to enter into
collaborative arrangements must be reinforced in both the structure and
operation of the partnership. Partnerships often possess qualities associated
with more than one partnership category or evolve with time from one type
to another. However, in most cases partnerships of a particular type do
possess common characteristics and can, therefore, be evaluated and analyzed
from that perspective. Discussion regarding the political implications of,these
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partnerships and an assessment of their success will be provided in chapters
six and seven.
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Chapter Four
CONSULTATIVE PARTNERSHIPS
Consultative partnerships, while not involving the direct sharing of power
associated with collaborative agreements, are nonetheless significant by virtue
of their proliferation within the public sector. OMNR staff have estimated
that approximately 45 percent of that ministry's partnership agreements are
'consultative in nature. 1 In addition, consultative partnerships present an
opportunity for non-governmental actors to influence government decision-
making, thereby exercising some degree of power. The extent and nature of
this influence will determine if partnerships of this type will evolve into
agreements in which power is shared more directly or formally.
Consultative partnerships provide a forum in which the government
solicits advice from outside sources such as non-governmental organizations,
groups and individuals. Unlike collaborative agreements, control in these
arrangements is retained by the government. The degree of influence
exercised by non-governmental partners is determined by such things as
whether the agreement is formalized, the extent of public interest in the issue,
the credibility of the partners and whether the results of the partnership are
made public.2 If non-governmental partners exercise substantial influence,
there is greater potential for the consultative partnership to evolve into a more
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collaborative arrangement.
Within the OMNR, as In many public organizations, this type of
agreement usually takes the form of advisory councils or citizens' committees
that advise the government regarding a specific policy issue. All the
consultative partnerships submitted in the District survey consisted of more
than four partners and most fulfilled a mandate which related to the
management of a particular resource or area. Occasionally, consultative
partnerships within this ministry have been established as a co-management
initiative with the intention that non-governmental partners will assume
progressively greater degrees of responsibility until the partnership becomes
truly collaborative.
This chapter will examIne two consultative partnerships within the
OMNR; namely, the Magpie Co-management Committee in Wawa and the
WeIland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee in WeIland, Ontario.
The social and political environment within which each partnership was
conceived and the key individuals or agencies involved will be reviewed. In
addition, the objectives, structure and operation of these two arrangements
will be discussed.
MANAGEMENT IN THE MAGPIE FOREST
The Magpie Co-Management Committee is a partnership whose creation
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was long and painful. Following years of animosity which culminated in a
public demonstration and the destruction of public property, this partnership
was born of necessity. The partnership itself consists of a committee of
interested stakeholders whose mandate includes the cooperative management
of natural resources such as timber and fisheries in the Magpie Forest. A
management area which includes all the contentious areas provides the
physical boundaries of the committee's jurisdiction.
History
The Magpie Forest is a 3875 square kilometre tract of land surrounding
the town of Dubreuilville in northern Ontario, and ~alls within the jurisdiction
of the Wawa District of the OMNR. Dubreuiville, located approximately 75
km northeast of the anglophone community of Wawa, is almost exclusively
francophone. Dubreuiville's economy is dominated by the logging industry
established by the Dubreuil brothers in the early 1950's. Activities such as
hunting, fishing and trapping are an integral part of the culture of the local
residents, many of whom feel they have an inherent right to gain access to
the surrounding land for these purposes.
Almost 100% of the available labour force in the village is employed
directly or indirectly by Dubreuil Forest Products. The company holds a
Forest Management Agreement (FMA) licence for most of the forest within
the Magpie Management Unit. The FMA requires the company to prepare
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Timber Management Plans (TMP) which identify areas for harvest and
renewal, road construction, road use and a variety of mitigating measures
aimed at reducing the impact of the harvest on other resource users. Any
change in these policies requires a formal amendment to the TMP.
The OMNR has continually had to reconcile the ongoing conflicts
between resource users. For example, the area supported one of the largest
concentrations of remote (fly-in) tourism facilities in Northern Ontario. The
remote tourism industry in the North Algoma area spent $8.1 million in 1988
to conduct normal operations and capital imprc;>vements. Moreover, 95
percent of its clientele is from the north central United States, qualifying the
industry as a net earner of foreign exchange and as a contributor to the
reduction of Ontario's tourism deficit.3
Owners of these facilities had concerns about the protection of their
operations from timber management activities and from excessive pressure by
road based recreationists such as anglers and hunters. Logging operations
and their access roads were gradually appearing closer to remote lakes
thereby providing opportunities for local residents to obtain access to
previously inaccessible lakes. The tourist operators claimed this was costing
them customers and income. In addition, they complained that the TMP
process was not conducive to receiving and considering comments from
unorganized groups such as theirs, due to strict time constraints which often
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conflicted with the demands of their industry.
In order to protect the backcountry setting of these facilities, the Wawa
District regulated public use on roads which Dubreuil Forest Products built
to access their harvest areas. These controls initially took the form of gates
and signs and were intended to prevent local residents from accessing
"designated" lakes. Because restrictive signs alone were more acceptable to
local anglers and hunters, they soon began replacing gates despite the fact
that the effectiveness of signage alone was questioned by the tourism
industry. Three gates remained on roads north of Dubreuilville and these
gates seemed to provide the impetus for a major confrontation between
recreationists, tourism operators and the OMNR.
The use of gates on these three roads was initially approved in the 1984-
1989 Forest Operating Plan and subsequently renewed in the 1989-1994
Timber Management Plan. The plans underwent public input and review at
four stages in the process, and were approved by the OMNR despite
escalating concerns by local residents and remote tourism operators. Each
year gates were vandalized and each year Dubreuil Forest Products, under the
direction of the OMNR, replaced them.
Local media coverage of the growing conflicts between resource users
was substantial. In addition, letters from residents of Dubreuiville were
published in the Toronto Star and a 400 name petition signed by residents
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was submitted to both the District Office and the Minister.
The conflicts came to a head on September 16, 1989, when more than
130 residents of Dubreuilville (mostly members of the Rod and Gun Club)
and media representatives, including the CBC, converged on the three
remaining gates. Using cutting torches, the demonstrators completely
destroyed the gates and burned the signs in a bid to force the OMNR's hand.
The situation in Dubreuiville was aggravated when three tourist outfitters
requested that the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) 'bump up' the Magpie
Forest Timber Management Plan to an individual environmental assessment
(EA). As the OMNR was operating under an Interim Exemption Order which
allowed it to proceed with TMP's as long as conditions associated with a
Class EA were followed, a 'bump up' would subject both the OMNR and the
forest company to long delays and additional costs. This 'bump up' request
was eventually denied by the Minister of the Environment provided the
OMNR comply with a number of conditions, including incorporating a
stakeholders' committee into the planning process. However, this decision
was made almost fifteen months after the Magpie Co-management
Committee was established.
The OMNR attempted to resolve the road access issue by initiating an
amendment to the 1989-1994 TMP which would change road access
mechanisms from gates to signage only. However, support for the
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amendments was almost equally divided between the remote tourism
operators and the local residents. As a result, the OMNR did not get the
required public support for approval of the amendment. It was at this point
that the Regional Director for the Sudbury Region of the OMNR established
the Magpie Co-Management Committee.
Partnership Creation
While partnerships are generally established with existing organizations,
there are occasions when a new organization must be created to facilitate the
partnership. The lack of any organized, cohesive unit of remote operators
presented a problem when selecting designated representatives of the industry.
As a result, the OMNR and the. Ministries of Tourism and Recreation and
Northern Development and Mines jointly funded a Remote Tourism Industry
Association (RTIA), essentially establishing a pressure group. Pressure
groups are a fundamental component of Canadian politics in that they provide
the day-to-day connections between government and private citizens.4 By
establishing and funding the RTIA, the OMNR created an organization which
would pursue its own interest and seek to influence public policy in a manner
congruent with those interests. In addition, these ministries subsidized the
hiring of a tourism coordinator whose mandate included representing the
industry in the new co-management setting.
The OMNR then hired a consultant to select committee members and to
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ensure that all pertinent interests were represented. Public notices sought
volunteers and a cross-section of ten individuals was selected on the basis of
criteria established by the consultant. The OMNR sits as a single member of
the committee. A two-day workshop provided the forum for the
development of a mission statement, objectives and an action plan for the
committee.
Partnership Operation
The Magpie Co-management Committee does not utilize formal terms
of reference. Rather, a mission statement defines their overall purpose as the
enhancement of social, economic and environmental values within the area.
This broad objective is to be achieved by soliciting public input and by
planning, advocating and initiating projects which strengthen the OMNR's
ability to meet its management objectives. 5
The key thrusts of the committee's work for the first five years is outlined
in a series of seven goals which are more specific in nature than the mission
statement. These goals include such things as the development of a
commonly agreed upon definition of 'remoteness', and the determination of
the sustainable level for all significant resources in the area. Implementation
or action plans provide even greater levels of detail, identifying time frames
and individuals responsible for the various activities of the committee.6
Decisions are made consensually by the committee. In the event that a
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consensus cannot be reached, committee members have agreed to refer the
issue to the OMNR. To date, there have been no occasions requiring a
referral of this type.
The members of the committee, with the assistance of the consultant
hired by the OMNR, developed a sociogram outlining the various concerns
and roles relating to the Magpie Forest and exhibited a high degree of
understanding of the extent and nature of the conflicts (See Appendix G). In
addition, roles and responsibilities were developed for both the committee
members and the chairperson.
The Magpie Co-management Committee plays both an advisory and an
operational role, providing input into the OMNR's planning processes and
performing various projects such as restocking lakes. During the first and
second years, the OMNR provided $20,000 and $8,000 respectively in seed
money for the projects undertaken by the committee and maintains that it will
continue to fund as necessary.7
The ongoing operation of the committee is such that the OMNR usually
refers resource management issues falling within the jurisdiction of the
Magpie Forest to the committee. Recommendations relating to these issues
are achieved by consensus of the group and are then presented to the OMNR
for approval. While the OMNR retains final authority regarding all
proposals, the consensual nature of the committee recommendations would
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make any attempt by the OMNR to disregard the recommendations difficult.
To date, every recommendation which has not conflicted with the OMNR's
policies or objectives has been implemented.8
Prior to the establishment of the Magpie Co-management Committee,
timber management planning for the forest proceeded according to the
requirements outlined in a draft TMP Manual developed by the OMNR.
These requirements include public participation at each stage in the planning
process. The public is initially invited to participate through advertisements
in the local media. Once the planning process is underway, public input is
solicited in 'open houses'.9
While this system did allow for public input, that input tended to be
fragmented and diffused by the fact that neither the remote tourism operators
nor the road based recreationists in Dubreuiville was organized into a
cohesive group. For example, each tourism operator had concerns which
were specific to his or her lake(s) which may have been very different from
the concerns of a fellow operator. Following the establishment of the RTIA,
two individual members of the industry as well as the tourism coordinator
represented the interests of the industry as a whole on the co-management
committee.
All of the partners bring some degree of power or influence to the table
during committee meetings, but the extent and nature of that power varies
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greatly from one partner to another. This has been perceived by several
members of the committee and senior management staff within the OMNR
as presenting a source of problems. Dubreuiville Forest Products possesses
a significant amount of influence by virtue of the fact that decisions which
would be deleterious to its timber interests could result in significant
economic impact within the community. The remote tourism operators, while
generating some employment in the area, do not function on the same scale
as the forest company; nor is their economic impact isolated to one
geographic area. However, all partners do exercise some influence based on
their credibility with members of the public and their ability to alter public
opinion regarding OMNR policy.
The committee submits no regular reports for either the OMNR or for the
organizations which the members represent. OMNR has relied on the
circulation of committee minutes, informal discussions with the OMNR
representative on the committee and good communications between the
committee chairperson and the District Manager as a means of keeping
informed on committee activities. IO However, the committee is currently
investigating the establishment of a weekly newspaper column in an attempt
to keep the public informed regarding their activities. Furthermore, public
.. notices of committee meetings now invite members of the public to attend
and participate.
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Since the creation of the committee, two of the most vocal tourism
operators selected to represent the industry on the committee have resigned.
Both these individuals cite frustration with the pre-existing planning
processes as the main reason for their reluctance to be involved. In addition,
they feel that the establishment of the committee was an attempt by the
OMNR to buy public support for timbering. These two individuals continue
to criticize government policy regarding resource management, but feel that
they had to resign from the committee to do so effectively.11
Those individuals representing the interest of road-based recreationists
also characterize their prior relationship with the OMNR as being adversarial
in nature, largely due to the road access issue. These participants in the
partnership continue to criticize OMNR policies but do not feel that their
involvement in the committee has hindered their ability to do so in any way.
Those organizations or individuals who conducted fairly cooperative relations
with the government prior to the establishment of the committee report no
significant change in this relationship.
The general level of satisfaction with both the committee and OMNR
policy among the current committee members is fairly high. Most members
are particularly satisfied with the success of operational projects such as fish
restocking. In addition, the majority of the partners feel that the operation of
the committee has enhanced their understanding of opposing interests and
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resource Issues regardless of whether their position on various issues has
changed.
The committee's success in achieving its stated goals as outlined in the
Planning Seminar Report has been varied. Three of the seven objectives
identified by tbe committee related to the development and acceptance of
commonly agreed upon definitions for concepts such as sustainable
development. In light of ongoing debates throughout the country regarding
sustainable levels of resource extraction, these goals were perhaps too
ambitious for a committee of this nature. The remaining objectives dealt with
tangible and measurable goals such as the development of road access
strategies. The committee has been very successful in meeting and, in some
cases, surpassing these objectives.
The initial two year term of the RTIA and the tourism coordinator
expired in the spring of 1993. Funding for the association has not been
renewed although discussions regarding a new term are ongoing. Without a
formal organization, representing the interests of the remote tourist operators
and maintaining an acceptable level of accountability to these individuals has
become increasingly difficult.
The Terms of Reference for the 1994-2016 TMP formally acknowledge
the Magpie Co-Management Committee as a partner to the OMNR's planning
team. The committee's responsibilities are specified to include reviewing all
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proposals, resource value maps, and draft plans, providing advice and
recommendations on a variety of issues, and communicating pertinent
information to the various user groups. 12
WELLAND RIVER CLEANUP PLANNING COMMITTEE
While the majority of the OMNR's partnerships have been initiated by
that ministry, the OMNR and most other government organizations participate
in a variety of partnerships which have been established either by other
government agencies or non-governmental organizations. It is for this reason
that the WeIland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee has been
included in this thesis. The OMNR is neither responsible for the partnership
formation nor its on-going operation. Nevertheless, the OMNR is a
necessary participant in the partnership by virtue of its mandate to provide
approvals under various pieces of legislation.
The partnership under examination consists of a planning committee of
interested stakeholders as well as representatives of three levels of
government. The mandate of the committee is two-fold in that it includes
both the planning and review of all aspects of the remediation of sections of
the WeIland River.
History
Since 1979, process waters from Atlas Specialty Steels (Atlas) have been
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treated and recycled within the Atlas plant or trea~ed and discharged into the
WeIland River. Prior to 1979, however, discharge from Atlas went directly
into the river along with process liquids from other area industries. The
result of this untreated discharge was an unsightly buildup of solid materials
often referred to as the 'Atlas Reef .13
A Brock University professor, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of
the Environment (MOE), undertook a preliminary investigation of the
sediments in the WeIland River in the mid-1980's, and confirmed the
existence of heavy metal contamination in the area of the Atlas sewer
outfall.14 Shortly thereafter, a second professor from Brock University was
commissioned to conduct research regarding the negative environmental
impact of this contamination and found that contaminant sources other than
Atlas were not predominant in the reef. Moreover, these heavy metals had
resulted in a 'dead zone' area within the river system in which no life
existed.15 In December, 1987, Atlas committed itself to a sediment cleanup
in the area of the Atlas Reef, and initiated a number of investigations to
determine the size and nature of the sediment and to examine cleanup
options.16
The 1980's was a period of increasing environmental sensitivity for many
Canadians. A number of environmental catastrophes, such as the burning of
Sandusky Creek in Ohio, focused attention on the extent of pollution within
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waterways on the continent.
The 1987 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between Canada and the
United States provided the impetus for coordinated efforts by governments
to restore the integrity of the Great Lakes Basin. Reports by the International
Joint Commission (IJC) identified 42 Areas of Concern in the basin, of which
17 are in Canada. Remedial Action Plans (RAPs) for the cleanup of these
areas are currently being developed by RAP teams made up of scientific and
technical staff from the three levels of government. Extensive public
involvement is being accomplished by incorporating Public Advisory
Councils (RAP-PACs) in the process. Funding is available for remediation
projects, provided that a number of criteria are met such as the principle that
the 'polluter pays' and that, whenever possible, funding partnerships are
pursued.17
One of these Areas of Concern exists on the Niagara River and, as a
result, a RAP team and a Public Advisory Council were established to
coordinate the remediation of the river. As the WeIland River is a tributary
of the Niagara River, concern developed among governmental and non-
governmental organizations regarding the presence of source contamination
in the river.18 These concerns, the findings of research and investigations,
and the commitment of Atlas to clean up sediment surrounding the reef,
culminated in the establishment of the WeIland River Cleanup Project
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Planning Committee.
Partnership Creation
The WeIland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee is comprised of
individuals representing Atlas, Brock University, the general public and
various branches of the three levels of government. Initially, however, only
Atlas, Brock University and the MOE were involved, meeting occasionally
to discuss the status of research on the river.
In 1989 Atlas hired the consulting firm of Acres International Ltd.
(Acres) to conduct investigations on the sediment and potential means of
contaminant cleanup in the WeIland River. Atlas, Acres and the MOE jointly
decided to establish a broader- based planning committee which would
facilitate greater levels of public involvement and would include important
stakeholders such as the OMNR. Together with Acres and the MOE, Atlas
began selecting representatives of the committee. Two citizens who lived on
the river were invited to participate in the committee. No invitation to
participate was issued to the general public until a recent Open House
designed to expand the level of community support for the project.
Representatives of all government agencies with approval authority relating
to the cleanup were also solicited.
The committee was initially established as an ad hoc committee, designed
to plan and oversee the completion of the reef cleanup by Atlas. However,
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as investigations were conducted, it became apparent that the extent of
contamination was greater than the visible section of the reef near the Atlas
sewer outfall. As the extent and nature of the contamination expanded, so
too did the scope of the committee's work. Additional government
organizations, such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, required
representation on the committee to ensure that all pertinent interests would
be heard. At the current time, the committee consists of twelve
representatives of governmental organizations, and three representatives each
of non-governmental organizations and the general public.
Partnership Operation
The WeIland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee is guided by
neither terms of reference nor a mission statement of any kind. Perhaps
because the committee was initially established on an ad hoc basis, the roles
and responsibilities of the individual representatives and the committee as a
whole have never been defined. There is general agreement among the
members regarding the overall objectives of the committee, namely the
planning and review of the WeIland River cleanup. However, there are
differences in the degree of emphasis placed on the committee's planning or
advisory role. Some of the committee members feel that until the cleanup is
actually underway, the committee will have accomplished little. 19
Representatives of government agencies as well as Atlas and Acres have
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been designated by their respective organizations. Approximately one half
of these representatives report regularly to their organization regarding the
committee's activities and/or recommendations. The remaining designated
representatives follow no regular reporting procedures. Representatives of the
general public have no forum for reporting to the public regarding the
committee's activities.
A consultant from Acres functions as the Committee chairperson.
Meetings are called as necessary and the format of the meetings varies.
Committee members are usually presented with an update of events or
research investigations. Discussion is open and informal and consensus on
issues of significance is usually achieved. Acres addresses the committee's
concerns in the project workplan and appropriate government approvals are
sought for the next stage of the project. Occasionally, there has been been
a period of months between meetings if progress is delayed pending research
findings or an investigation report.
Committee members exhibit a sound understanding of both the
perspectives and mandates of other representatives. Many of the
organizations, such as theOMNR and the MOE, work together frequently and
are, therefore, familiar with legislation and procedures which apply to the
other organizations. In other cases, this understanding has developed as a
direct result of participation in the partnership.
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While committee members are cognizant of each organization's role and
responsibilities, not all of them are satisfied with the extent to which these
mandates conflict. After three separate investigations of the river sediment
it was determined that the associated area of contamination was substantially
greater than originally anticipated. This resulted in a further investigation of
the floodplain area in which contamination was found up to 30 metres from
the riverbank.20 Since the river and the floodplains are inextricably linked,
remediation of the river cannot proceed unless the floodplain can be
remediated at the same time.
The mandates and philosophies of many of the government organizations,
however, address floodplain contamination and remediation differently. The
MOE's approach is to remove contaminated material from the area, while
Environment Canada's guidelines stipulate that the contaminants can be
contained in the area so long as they cause no direct harm to the public. The
OMNR's mandate, however, emphasizes that floodplain habitat would require
replacement if dredgeate is removed. 21 Until the issue of floodplain
remediation is resolved, therefore, the committee cannot proceed further in
either the planning or the implementation stage of the partnership.
The extent and nature of the power that each participant brings to the
partnership varies greatly. Some of the agencies represented possess approval
authority under various statutes and regulations. As a result, these agencies
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can block the implementation of the clean up. The OMNR's legislative
authority in this regard, for example, stems from the Lakes and Rivers
Improvement Act and the Canada Fisheries Act. Environment Canada,
OMNR, MOE and the Niagara Region Conservation Authority all possess
authority sufficient to halt the progress of the project. Other members, such
as those from the academic community, bring specific knowledge to the
partnership which can influence both the public and the committee members.
Perhaps the least able to exert influence within this partnership are those
representing the public at large. These individuals possess no special
knowledge, nor is their approval required at any stage in the process.
Furthermore, without a great deal of media coverage, it has been difficult for
these individuals to communicate to the general public either concerns or
support for the cleanup project.
Citizen representatives on the committee had virtually no relationship
with the various government agencies prior to their involvement in the
partnership, while members of the academic community worked cooperatively
with many of the agencies despite frequent criticism of government policies
and/or procedures. The majority of the participants in this partnership are
representatives of government agencies. Consequently, the partnership itself
has had little impact on the nature of the relationship between these
organizations. However, any attempt to plan a project in which so many
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government agencIes are involved has the potential of accelerating the
progress of the project as the different jurisdictions debate, compromise and
co-ordinate their efforts.
Both Atlas and the Regional Municipality of Niagara worked
cooperatively with a number of these agencies, particularly the MOE, prior
to the partnership. Despite the positive nature of their on-going relationship,
both have had occasion to either criticize or resist government policy.
Representatives of these two organizations now feel that the partnership has
resulted in a greater level of understanding concerning the interests of their
organizations and the government agencies involved. 22
The majority of the non-governmental partners still critique the policies
of the various agencies of the government. Some feel that their position on
the committee has made it difficult for them to pe open in their criticism.
Others support the belief that 'knowledge is strength', stating that their
involvement in the partnership has made them more aware of government
policy and its impact, thereby allowing them to criticize policy in a more
informed and constructive manner.23
In 1991, the committee secured $.3 million from Environment Canada's
Cleanup Fund to be combined with a substantial contribution by Atlas. The
funds were used in the development of cleanup technology for the project and
the completion of a dredging demonstration project in 1991 in which the
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proposed technology was tested and approved. To date, Atlas Steel has
committed $1.7 million towards consultant fees, research and the
demonstration project. No other agencies have contributed financial support.
The OMNR did secure approval for a $10,000 contribution to the project in
1992; however, their fiscal year ended before the funds could be utilized.24
The four investigations which have been completed have clearly indicated
that the area of contamination extends further upstream and downstream of
the Atlas Reef than anticipated. In addition, studies have identified both
floodplain contamination and the existence of other sources of pollution
including the treatment plant belonging to the Regional Municipality of
Niagara. At the present time, Atlas has withdrawn its financial support for
consultant fees. Atlas has also postponed any cleanup activity until the extent
of their liability and that of other polluters is determined.
The Committee is currently attempting to secure a chairperson from the
Niagara Region Conservation Authority. It is felt that this organization, being
a semi-autonomous body, would perform this function adequately.25 The
Committee is also attempting to expand the degree of both community
awareness and community support for the project. To this end, the public
was invited to attend an Open House which was held on June 26, 1993. The
level of response by the general public was high. However, very few of the
114 industries and public agencies invited to attend the meeting made an
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appearance.
This chapter has examined two consultative partnerships involving the
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. One of the partnerships, the Magpie
Co-Management Committee, was established and funded by the OMNR. The
second partnership, the WeIland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee,
while being established by organizations outside the OMNR, nonetheless
requires its participation. These two partnerships are typical of the type and
character of consultative partnerships in which the OMNR participates.
The Magpie Co-Management Committee has continued to evolve since
its inception to become somewhat collaborative in nature. This is evidenced
by the inclusion of the committee within the formal planning processes of the
OMNR. Furthermore, this partnership illustrates the extent to which a
partnership arrangement may possess criteria associated with more than one
partnership category. The Magpie Co-Management Committee, while
considered to be primarily consultative, performs a variety of operational
functions and is assuming greater levels of decision-making responsibility.
The WeIland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee is more limited
both in its decision-making ability and its scope of operation. This particular
partnership illustrates the need for ongoing evaluation and reassessment of
partnership mandates to reflect accurately the changing environment within
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which partnerships must function. Discussion regarding the political
implications of these two partnerships and an assessment of their success will
follow in chapters six and seven.
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Chapter Five
OPERATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
Staff within the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources estimate that
approximately forty-five per cent of their existing partnerships are operational
in nature. These partnerships are characterized by a sharing of work of a
physical or non-physical nature and may also involve the sharing of financial
or material resources. While operational partnerships usually result in the
public organization retaining power, the non-governmental partners often
exercise some degree of influence depending on the extent and nature of their
operational involvement. Moreover, this type of arrangement, while not
empowering the participants to the same extent as collaborative partnerships,
may result in more efficient or responsive program delivery.!
Within the OMNR, operational partnerships usually take the form of
simple agreements between the Ministry and local organizations or citizens
for the purpose of completing a specific operation. Very occasionally they
are large scale agreements, such as U.S.-Canada joint rehabilitation ventures,
requiring significant coordination and a sound legal foundation for the
arrangement.
Partnerships which fall within other categories often exhibit
characteristics common to operational partnerships. For example, many of
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the collaborative partnerships examined involved the operational participation
of the partners. Furthermore, operational involvement was often cited as a
prerequisite to participant satisfaction in other types of partnership. The
difference, therefore, between operational partnerships and collaborative or
consultative arrangements lies in the degree to which partners are directly
involved in policy development and decision-making and the extent to which
power is shared.
This chapter will examine two operational partnerships within the OMNR,
namely, the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility. in Thunder Bay and the
Goodyear Fishway in Bowmanville. Descriptive detail regarding the
establishment, structure and operation of the two partnerships will be
provided. The political implications, success factors and limitations of these
partnerships will be discussed further in Chapters six and seven.
THE TROUT LAKE WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY
The Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility presented the OMNR with a
number of problems, not the least of which was funding. To alleviate the
internal stresses which the Ministry faced as well as to satisfy public demands
regarding the facility, the OMNR established a partnership with a community
organization to share both the funding and the operation of the site while
maintaining sale decision-making authority regarding its operation. As a
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result, the facility has become a model which is being duplicated to various
degrees both inside and outside the Thunder Bay District of the OMNR.
History
The OMNR is responsible for the operation and management of all
dumping facilities on Crown land and in unorganized areas. The Ministry of
the Environment (MOE) regulates these facilities. The Trout Lake Waste
Disposal Site, located 15 km from the Thunder Bay City Dump, is only one
of twenty-seven sites which the OMNR operates in that District. It serves
both permanent and seasonal residents in Gorham, Ware, Fowler and Jacques
Townships.
In 1974, the OMNR was issued a Provisional Certificate of Approval for
the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site under the Environmental Protection Act
(EPA) of 1971. The Certificate of Approval specifies the type of waste, site
area and other variables while Regulation 309 of the EPA outlines the
conditions of operation for such facilities. Trout Lake was certified to accept
domestic waste only and the primary conditions of operation included the
provision of good quality access roads to the site; restricted access which was
limited to those times when an attendant is on duty; a "no-burn" site
maintenance policy; and the enclosure of the facilities to prevent entry by
unauthorized persons.2
While the "no-burn" policy was included in the regulations to prevent the
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emission of toxic fumes into the environment, prior to 1987 it was seldom
enforced. In fact, until 1987 the Trout Lake dump was operated in much the
same manner as other facilities in unorganized areas, having no restrictions
on users or types of waste.3 Consequently, waste disposal site inspection
reports issued by the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) indicated that
compliance with the Certificate of Approval was very poor.
With the 'greening' of public opinion in the mid 1980's, the MOE began
to move towards stricter enforcement of its regulations. This was beginning
to increase dump site maintenance costs for the OMNR in order to compact
and cover waste materials and provide more 'environmentally friendly'
facilities.
Despite this change in orientation, the Trout Lake dump remained a
problem. Not only was the site constantly messy, but people often set fire
to their refuse, leaving smouldering trenches and blowing garbage to create
a fire hazard. Consequently, nearby residents often faced the threat of
wildfires and were subjected to very malodorous and potentially noxious
fumes. At times, the strewn garbage and smoke made it impossible to drive
close to the site.
The dump site was also being heavily overused by residents of Thunder
Bay and by commercial and industrial users who felt inconvenienced by the
restrictions at the Thunder Bay site and who resisted paying the user fees in
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place at that facility.
During one outbreak of dump burning, a minor explosion occurred and
fumes of unknown chemicals were released into the air in the vicinity of the
OMNR fire crews. The OMNR fire staff thereafter refused to extinguish fires
at the Trout Lake site unless they were provided with training and adequate
safety equipment such as breathing apparatus. Due to the seasonal nature of
fire staff, however, the OMNR felt that thorough training for chemical fire
management was unrealistic.
During 1986 and 1987, the property owners in the affected townships
stepped up their campaign to force the OMNR to meet the requirements of
the Certificate of Approval for the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site.
Residents called the District Manager's home at all hours of the day and night
to report fires at the dump and to register complaints. A series of meetings
took place between the property owners, the OMNR and provincial
politicians. Unfortunately, the OMNR's waste disposal program was
chronically underfunded and this made compliance with all of the MOE's
requirements difficult.
In 1988 an attendant was hired to supervise and direct users of the site
and while the site remained open twenty-four hours a day, good coverage by
the attendant was attempted through flexible scheduling during peak periods
of use. Unfortunately, while use of the site improved during supervised
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periods, success was limited due to the twenty-four hour access and lack of
any enclosure or gate. This attempt at a solution was not only expensive, but
unauthorized fires continued and the residents' campaign to rectify the
situation intensified.
One year later the conditions at the site had not significantly improved.
The Acting District Manager felt strongly that the MOE could not make an
exception by allowing the OMNR to continue operating facilities in a manner
which would result in enforcement action if undertaken by the private sector.
The Lands Program Manager had a strong orientation towards consultative
management and in an attempt to resolve the issue, he and the District
Manager developed a strategy for the Trout Lake site which included the
concept of regulated use of the site and the introduction of a user pay
system.4 These restrictions were intended to be instituted gradually with
restricted access only being implemented that year.
By the end of July, 1989, a gate was in place at the site. An attendant
at the site distributed a questionnaire to site users regarding peak periods of
use and in accordance with the results of this survey the site was open three
days a week only, for eight hours each day. During the fall and winter, a
local person was hired to open and close the gate during the days when
dumping was allowed, but no attendant remained on the site.
Not all of the residents were pleased with either the decision to restrict
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access, or the selection of days the site would be open. While they were all
notified in writing of the changes in operation, some felt that they had not
been adequately consulted prior to the decision being made. Despite the
occasional letter, however, complaints dropped off, the number of
unauthorized fires was greatly reduced and the volume of waste decreased
substantially since Thunder Bay residents were no longer authorized to use
the site. Site inspection reports by the MOE also improved. While these
actions resolved the issue temporarily, the cost of providing an attendant at
the site, even during peak seasons, was prohibitive. An alternative approach
to site maintenance was required.
Partnership Creation
In March, 1990, OMNR staff sent a letter to 726 property owners within
a defined usage area, outlining the problems the Ministry faced at the Trout
Lake Waste Disposal Site. Residents were presented with six options for
solving the problems and were asked either to select one of the options or to
submit an alternative strategy for resolution of the problem.5
The responses to the questionnaire overwhelmingly supported the option
which proposed that the OMNR continue to operate the dump while
upgrading that facility to satisfy the MOE Certificate of Approval. Funding
would be provided either by a per-visit charge or a yearly permit fee. By
May 3, 1990, residents were notified that the OMNR would accept their
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choice, and permits were made available for sale. The local branch of the
March of Dimes was initially offered a short-term contract for operation of
the facility on a payment for service basis. The March of Dimes accepted
this contract. The following year, OMNR staff again considered their options
regarding the waste disposal site. At this time the concept of a long-term
partnership between the OMNR and the March of Dimes was considered. A
service agreement outlining the operation and maintenance responsibilities of
each partner was developed by legal staff within the OMNR and presented
to representatives of the March of Dimes.
Partnership .Operation
A service agreement provides the legal and operational framework within
which the OMNR and the March of Dimes partnership must function. The
roles and responsibilities of each of the partners are outlined within this
document while OMNR policies regarding financial management for revenue
incentive initiatives provide guidelines for all financial statements for which
the March of Dimes is responsible.
The purpose of the partnership, as defined within OMNR correspondence,
IS to manage and operate the facility in a man~er which will mitigate a
variety of physical and financial problems associated with the site as well as
increase the level of public support for its continued operation.6
The March of Dimes sells annual permits directly to users. Permit
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revenue is applied to operational expenses, and any excess may be used to
fund other community programs being implemented by that organization.
The OMNR provides any shortfall in funds generated by permit sales. In this
way, both partners have a financial stake in the ~uccessful operation of the
site.
The March of Dimes praIses this partnership as an "opportunity for
independence", maintaining that the arrangement not only provides them with
an avenue for revenue generation, but also facilitates the training and
employment of disabled persons.7 While the March of Dimes is responsible
for the on-going operation of the facility, the OMNR provides material
resources, professional advice, and, occasionally, human resources if they are
needed for site maintenance or new initiatives. The OMNR continues to hold
the Certificate of Approval for the facility. Decisions pertaining to the site's
daily operation are made by the March of Dimes. However, the OMNR
retains final decision-making authority and responsiblity for the site and any
new initiatives or changes in operation must be approved by that Ministry.
Nevertheless, the success of the partnership and the level of both public
awareness and support which it has achieved have made it difficult for the
OMNR unilaterally to make decisions regarding the future of the facility.
The partnership has spawned greater public involvement and ownership
in other areas typically existing within the domain of the public sector. For
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example, a number of citizens, encouraged by the extent to which the public
determined the future of the Trout Lake facility, have established a Trout
Lake Recycling Committee. This committee is currently pursuing a large
scale recycling program for materials deposited at the facility.
The March of Dimes prepares monthly financial statements outlining all
expenses and revenue to the OMNR. In addition, reports regarding the
operation of the facility are prepared for use within the March of Dimes
organization.
Prior to the establishment of the partnership, the March of Dimes had no
ongoing relationship with the OMNR. However, the organization has had
occasion to criticize government in policy areas relating to their operations.
The Trout Lake Waste'Management partnership has not altered this criticism
of other ministries in any way.
Since the establishment of this partnership, conditions at the Trout Lake
Waste Disposal Facility have significantly improved. The site now satisfies
all conditions associated with the Certificate of Approval. The volume of
waste being deposited at the site has been greatly reduced as have
maintenance and operational costs. Deposits of industrial or commercial
waste are virtually non-existent as are unauthorized fires. The number of
permits sold has been increasing since 1991 and while the March of Dimes
has not yet had surplus revenue which can be applied to their community
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programs, they hope to achieve this goal in the near future. 8
The OMNR has benefitted from extremely positive public relations as a
result of the establishment of this partnership. An editorial in a local
newspaper states that the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility is not only a
model dump; "it is an example of how and why people should assume a
measure of responsibility for their own lives. It is a lesson in how
government cannot be expected to be all things to all people, and why it
should not be. ,,9
THE GOODYEAR FISHWAY
The Goodyear Fishway is a device which allows the passage of particular
species of fish through the Goodyear dam on the Bowmanville Creek in
Ontario. Constructed and operated as a result of a partnership between the
OMNR, the Bowmanville Creek Anglers Association (BCAA) and the federal
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the fishway typifies operational
partnerships within the OMNR.
History
Among anglers, rainbow trout is considered to be a highly sought game
specIes. However, years of urban and rural development and the
consequential damage to fish habitat have resulted in declining fish
populations in many areas of the province. During the 1970's, the Lindsay
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District of the OMNR was no exception. A number of streams flowing into
Lake Ontario were producing very small populations of rainbow trout due to
the presence of dams which the fish could not ascend. As rainbow trout
require access both to streams for spawning and to a larger lake where they
mature, the dams prevented the young and adult fish from migrating.
Streams which drained into Lake Ontario in the Coburg and Bowmanville
areas presented anglers with potentially good trout spawning and rearing
habitat. Two dams, namely, the Goodyear dam and the Vanstone dam, had
raised the ire of anglers for years and in response to their complaints, OMNR
staff manually transferred between two and three hundred fish over the two
dams each year. Despite this manual transfer, complaints from anglers and
sportswriters continued.10
During the early 1980's, a group of concerned sportspersons established
the Bowmanville Creek Anglers Association. Once established, this
organization assumed the responsibility for the manual fish transfer,
maintaining that the OMNR was not transferring enough fish to ensure an
adequate population. Funding for the transfer was supplied to the
organization from a Community Fisheries Involvement Program (CFIP) fund
until 1985.
In 1985, the Vanstone dam washed out, leaving the Goodyear dam as the
only barrier to rainbow trout in the river. For the next few years, the
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Goodyear Co. agreed to open the dam for approximately one week each year
to enable passage of the fish from Lake Ontario. This situation continued
until the City of Bowmanville discovered that Goodyear had an unmetered
water line, which meant that excesses of water which were used when the
dam was open were not charged back to the company. Goodyear was
informed by the City that continuing to open the dam annually would cost the
company approximately $1500. each year.!!
OMNR staff had been aware of the problems -on the river for years and
while they had considered the construction of a fishway at each of the dams,
the cost was prohibitive. Costs associated with the construction of a single
fishway at the Goodyear dam site ranged from $100,000 to $120,000,
including labour. As the OMNR was in a period of fiscal constraint at the
time, this option remained outside of the Ministry's means and a proposal by
the Bowmanville Creek Anglers Association to build a fishway with CFIP
funding was declined.!2
Partnership Creation
The partnership which led to the construction and operation of the
Goodyear Fishway resulted not from the initiative of OMNR staff, but from
the committment of members of the anglers association. Once the CFIP
proposal for a fishway was rejected, a small number of members of the
Bowmanville Creek Anglers Association began soliciting financial support for
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the project from local businesses, municipalities and organizations. The
OMNR was again approached, this time to enter into an arrangement whereby
the OMNR and the Bowmanville Creek Anglers Association would jointly
construct and operate a fishway which was funded primarily from donations.
The OMNR accepted the initiative and provided $6,000 in CFIP funding
towards the construction of the fishway. In addition, the OMNR signed a
legal agreement between the OMNR and Goodyear allowing the construction
of a fishway on the company's dam. Shortly thereafter, the federal
Department of Fisheries and Oceans requested that a sea lamprey trap be
incorporated into the fishway, offering both financial and human resource
support for the partnership.
Partnership Operation
The Goodyear Fishway partnership is guided by no formal agreement of
any kind. A verbal agreement between staff of the OMNR and of the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans on the one hand, and the President of the
anglers association on the other, defines the roles and responsibilities of each
of the partners. In fact, OMNR staff are unsure as to the legal status of the
fishway in terms of ownership or liability.13
A variety of local businesses, the City of Newcastle, the OMNR and the
Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans provided the $42,000 which was
necessary for material costs and those portions of the fishway construction
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which were contracted out. The three partners themselves also contributed
volunteer labour whenever possible.
Decisions regarding the periods of operation of the fishway are generally
made by the anglers association, but require the final approval of the OMNR.
On no occasion has OMNR staff rejected such a recommendation. Both the
OMNR and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans have provided expertise
and material resources if maintenance of the fishway is required. During the
construction of the fishway, the OMNR provided engineering and design staff
while the anglers association provided a substantial amount of donated labour.
None of the partners follows any regular reporting procedures regarding
the success or operation of the fishway to their respective organizations.
OMNR staff cite funding and staff shortages as the reason that no regular
monitoring of the success of the device is performed.14
Representatives of both the OMNR and the Anglers Association maintain
that the partnership has resulted in a better understanding of the activities and
interests of the other partners. OMNR staff, in particular, state that while
they still receive criticism of their fisheries management policies by members
of the anglers association, that criticism is no longer hostile in nature. Field
staff in the public organizations appear to be relating to members of the
anglers association as individuals as opposed to representatives of 'the
government'. Members of the Anglers Association, on the other hand, are
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more cognizant both of the responsibilities associated with the OMNR's
mandate and the limitations it faces as a public organization.
This chapter has examined two operational partnerships involving the
OMNR. Each of these partnerships typifies both the nature of and problems
associated with operational partnerships. In the initial stages of the Trout
Lake Waste Disposal Facility partnership, the operation of the site was merely
contracted out to the March of Dimes. The. relationship between the
government and the March of Dimes could only be considered a partnership
once a number of criteria were satisfied. These criteria include the presence
of an ongoing relationship between the two organizations, shared risks and
benefits, and continued operational involvement by the OMNR. This case
illustrates the tendency to consider· contracting out services to be a type of
partnership.
The Goodyear Fishway provides an example of an operational agreement
which falls within the confines of the centrally operated CFIP program. CFIP
agreements were often cited in the District survey as operational partnerships.
In many cases, however, these arrangements more accurately represent a type
of sponsorship agreement in which the government organization funds a
particular project to be undertaken by either an organization or an individual
citizen. In the absence of anyon-going relationship between participants or
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any operational involvement on the part of the OMNR, these arrangements
should not be considered to be partnerships of any type.
Both of these partnerships illustrate the narrow scope which is common
to operational partnerships. Most agreements of this type are designed to
implement a specific program or project. This characteristic of operational
partnerships often results in a briefer relationship between the partners than
either collaborative or consultative arrangements. It appears that regular
interaction between the participants for the duration of the arrangement,
operational involvement and the mutual sharing of risks and benefits are more
significant criteria when determining if a particular arrangement constitutes
an operational partnership. Discussion regarding the political implications of
these partnerships and an assessment of their success will follow in chapters
six and seven.
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Chapter Six
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS: PUBLIC SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS
Partnerships are just one of a number of public sector initiatives which
are changing the context of governance. A significant issue in the study of
anyone of these initiatives is the impact it will have on our system of
government. Specifically, an examination should be made of the impact of
management initiatives such as partnerships on the constitutional convention
of ministerial responsibility and the practice of public service accountability.
In addition, we must recognize that if partnerships progress to become
part of a long-term strategy in government, they will influence not only the
government's response to demands for programs and services, but also the
nature of government's relationship with its clients and stakeholders. If
partnership arrangements are successful, the relationship between government
and stakeholders must necessarily become less paternal and dictatorial and
more cooperative and consultative.
The inevitability of this change is due to the fact that true partnerships
require a shift in power so that power, in the sense of decision-making
authority, is shared among the partners. Furthermore, decision-making
authority, which has traditionally rested within the domain of either elected
officials or the public service, would be vested with individuals and groups
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outside the government and, therefore, outside of the influence of
parliamentary conventions.
This chapter will examine the traditions of ministerial responsibility and
accountability and will determine, both in theory and in practice, how
government- stakeholder partnerships affect these traditions. References will
be made to the actual implementation of the partnership case studies outlined
in chapters three, four and five.
In addition, this chapter will address assertions by some theorists that
partnerships provide a mechanism for reducing public criticism of government
policy by coopting the participants. The extent to which power has been
shared as a result of the OMNR partnerships and the environment in which
the partnerships were established will be examined to determine if interest
group activity and/or political pressure contributed to their development.
Lastly, this chapter will answer the question: Do partnerships truly alter the
government-stakeholder relationship?
A Tradition of Responsibility
The issue of governmental responsibility is fundamental to the
relationship which exists between the governed and the governors. This
responsibility can only be realized if both political and administrative
accountability within government are maintained. In Canada, as in many
other parliamentary democracies, the convention of ministerial responsibility
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and the practice of public service accountability define the extent to which
the exercise of power is controlled and responsibility for governing is
ensured.
Through the minister, the legislature and, therefore, the public are able
to hold the executive of the government, that is, the Cabinet, accountable for
its actions. In theory, ministers are responsible for the actions and decisions
of their departments regardless of whether they were aware of them. While
in the strictest sense this convention requires that "?-inisters are answerable for
the actions of their departments to the extent that they should resign if a
serious error occurs, this does not happen in practice. It is generally accepted
in government today that ministers cannot be held directly responsible for
administrative errors of which they had no personal knowledge.! However,
if the personal culpability of a minister is evident, the Prime Minister (or
provincial Premier) may accept or request the minister's resignation.
A more applicable interpretation of ministerial responsibility suggests that
ministers are answerable to Parliament for everything done within their
departments to the extent that they will investigate errors, take corrective
action, and report to Parliament and, therefore, to the public on the activities
of their subordinates. The ability of elected officials to do so, however, is
based on the permanancy of public servants and the continuity of public
administration.2 This is particularly true when an incumbent minister
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becomes answerable for the activities of a department under his or her
predecessors.
Fundamental to the convention of ministerial· responsibility is the belief
that government must be held accountable for its actions. Moreover, since
public servants exercise authority which is vested in them by elected officials,
they too must be held accountable. Accountability relationships, therefore,
exist between the public and elected officials and between operating
departments and the public through departmental ministers. A number of
accountability mechanisms, ranging from the constitution to departmental
reports, formally ensure, in theory, that these accountability relationships are
realized.
A combination of factors, including the growing complexity and size of
government, have made it increasingly difficult to identify individuals
responsible for the various activities of government. Despite the difficulties
associated with enforcing accountability within government, the fundamental
accountability relationships between politicians, public officials and the public
have not been altered.3 The minister is still ultimately responsible for the
activities of his or her department and public servants remain accountable up
the chain of command to the minister.
The question is whether partnerships alter, in some practical way, the
ability of the public to hold ministers and public servants responsible for their
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actions. It has already been noted that identifying individuals responsible for
the actions or decisions of the government has become increasingly difficult
as government responsibilities have grown. Partnerships necessarily make
isolating those responsible for errors more difficult as the number of people
involved in the decision-making process increases.
The public sector has always been subject to strict accountability
requirements. As a result, public servants and elected officials have often had
very little tolerance for the assumption of risks or the outcome of mistakes.
Public officials and political aides spend a great many hours ensuring that
their ministers are not embarassed by the media or an opposition which
delights in an opportunity to highlight administrative errors within the
government.
To the extent that partnership agreements devolve decision-making
authority, therefore, they present an undeniable risk to government. Not only
is power being shared with partners not traditionally accountable to the public
or the government, but the exercise of authority by non-governmental
partners makes administrative continuity more difficult. Partners representing
non-governmental organizations are not subject to the same rules which bind
public servants and the involvement of non-governmental participants in a
partnership may be subject to many outside influences relating either to their
respective organization or their personal commitments. The ability of
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ministers to answer for the activities of non-governmental partners in an
administrative environment which could be constantly changing is clearly
more limited than their ability to answer for the actions of public servants.
Environment Canada defines a partnership as a legal relationship in which
the partners share both profits and losses and the actions of each partner bind
the others. They note that such a relationship has implications relating to the
legal liability of the partners and should, therefore, only be embarked upon
when it is understandable that a liability exists.4 Furthermore, the
experimental nature of partnerships may result in hidden financial risks
associated with unforeseen costs, threats to a department's credibility or image
and the risk that partners may subordinate the public interest to self-interest.5
The devolution of power to non-governmental partners implies a
corresponding devolution of responsibility for the exercise of that power.6
The conventions of ministerial responsibility and public service accountability
within government are attempts to control the exercise of power. If
partnerships do alter the power relationships between government and
stakeholders, therefore, the belief that those who· exercise power should be
held accountable must change, or new accountability relationships must be
established. Public officials cannot simply give up power and resources to
non-governmental partners. Rather, they must ensure that they have the
authority to do so and that there is adequate accountability for the results.7
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Partnerships make some diffusion of accountability inevitable by virtue of the
number .and alliances of the players involved in decision-making.
Government has to decide, therefore, how much p.ower it is willing to share,
and which accountability mechanisms it will employ to ensure that power is
exercised responsibly.
The Algonquin Forestry Authority (AFA) illustrates the extent to which
government can devolve power in a partnership, and the accountability
requirements of its doing so. The Authority itself was established by an act
of the legislature outlining its mandate and the extent of its authority. A
series of legally binding documents such as the Timber Management Plan and
the Forest Management Undertaking further identify and clarify the roles and
responsibilities of both the AFA and the OMNR. The accountability
relationships of AFA staff and its board of directors are explicitly outlined
within these documents. The chairperson of the Authority, while expected
to cooperate fully with public officials from the OMNR, is directly
answerable only to the Minister of Natural Resources. Furthermore, all
activities performed or directed by the Authority must be documented in an
annual report which is audited by the provincial Auditor General.
The AFA is accountable to the public not only through the Minister, but
also directly through public meetings and the process of public consultation
associated with the timber management planning process. The OMNR and
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ultimately the Minister retain authority for ensuring that the AFA's decisions
comply with the goals and policies of the government and that management
of parks continues in a manner congruent with the public interest.
While the OMNR's partnership policy states that appropriate
accountability frameworks must be established so that the progress of
proposed partnership arrangements can be monitored,8 new accountability
mechanisms were found to be almost totally lacking, with the exception of
those associated with the AFA. None of the five remaining partnerships
examined required formal reporting procedures to either the OMNR or the
represented organizations or groups. Moreover, only the Magpie Co-
management Committee and the Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management
Committee had terms of reference or mission statements to guide their
activities or outline the roles and responsibilities of the partners.
The AFA and the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site partnerships were the
only arrangements supported by legal agreements of any kind. In some cases,
representatives were not delegated by the various organizations but were
selected and appointed directly by OMNR staff. Regardless of the method
of selection of the individuals involved in the arrangements, only the March
of Dimes (Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site) and the now disbanded RTIA
(Magpie Co-management Committee) reported back to their respective
organizations regarding the activities of the partnership. The informal nature
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of many of the partnerships precluded the partners reporting back to their
various constituencies.
If a trend regarding the establishment of an accountability framework can
be gleaned from the six cases considered, it would appear that the extent to
which formal accountability procedures were established corresponded closely
with the degree of responsibility being conferred as a result of the
partnership. Where formal accountability mechanisms were developed (i.e.,
the AFA), the government relinquished greater degrees of decision-making
authority. If no accountability mechanisms were -established, control of the
project and/or the policy area was more closely maintained by the OMNR.
In addition, when a partnership arrangement is formalized, such as the
establishment of the AFA, the government appears to be held responsible
more for the nature of the agreement itself, or the process of partnering, and
less for the results of the arrangement. While the government retains overall
responsibility for the establishment of the policy framework within which
provincial park management occurs, criticism regarding decisions which relate
to the actual harvesting operations are often directed at the AFA.
According to Marcel Masse, government must inevitably continue to shed
program implementation responsibilities, while assumIng greater
responsibilities in the areas of consultation, explanation, negotiation,
persuasion and partnership.9 In light of government attempts to find new
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ways to deliver services with scarce public funds, perhaps the move towards
partnership arrangements is inevitable as they provide an avenue for reducing
costs while still maintaining some degree of control. The degree of control
retained by government determines the type of partnership and the
accountability mechanisms which must necessarily be enforced if the
responsible exercise of authority is to be ensured.
While partnerships reflect a change in the government's orientation from
one of implementing and delivering programs to one of facilitating program
delivery, they also necessitate a change in political culture. Governments
must be prepared to accept this new role by relinquishing power and
responsibility to involved stakeholders. Doing so requires both the
acceptance of risks and tolerance of mistakes. Furthermore, politicians are
usually geared toward making policy decisions which satisfy short-term
considerations. Partnerships, on the other hand, often involve long-term
ventures the results of which are neither visible nor measurable in the short-
term. Establishing a partnership with the newly created AFA for the
management of Algonquin Park, for example, required that provincial
politicians subordinate the potential short-term economic implications
resulting from the termination of eighteen Orders In Council with local
forestry companies, and pursue a long-term solution to the problem of park
management. Notwithstanding the immediate benefit that the partnership had
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by keeping the government at arm's length from a volatile political issue, the
arrangement reflects a willingness on the part of government to place
significant issues in the hands of stakeholders for the achievement of long-
term benefits.
Partnerships also have the obvious political benefits associated with
reducing tensions between the government and stakeholders. The Magpie
Co-management Committee is a prime example of how the government
neutralized growing tensions among stakeholders and between stakeholders
and the government. While areas of conflict remain between these groups,
the partnership has provided a forum for solving these problems while
displaying a commitment to broader based decision-making.
The OMNR notes that the synergistic effect of partners working together
enables the achievement of objectives which would not otherwise be
attainable by the individual partners.10 This synergy is evident on
examination of a number of the OMNR partnership case studies. The
construction and operation of the Goodyear fishway, for example, was beyond
the resources of either the government, the Federal Department of Fisheries
and Oceans, or the Bowmanville Anglers Association. Together, however,
the partners achieved something which benefitted each of the partners as well
as the public in general. Partnerships which resolve problems or satisfy
stakeholder demands, therefore, have obvious political benefits.
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Lastly, partnership arrangements have potential implications for the role
of the public official within government. The politics-administration
dichotomy, once thought to prevail in government, no longer reflects
accurately the role of bureaucrats in decision-making. Partnerships put
additional pressure on this dichotomy as they politicize the role of
bureaucrats. Public officials involved in partnership arrangements such as the
Magpie Co-management Committee must, to some extent, juggle the interests
of constituencies. In becoming responsible for the allocation of scarce
resources, the role of public officials as administrators is more actively
involved in the realm of politics.
Partnerships and Cooptation
True partnerships promote the sharing of power, responsibility and
accountability between the government and stakeholders, their ultimate
objective being the democratization of the decision-making process. The
question posed by some theorists, however, is whether partnerships succeed
in this democratization or whether they actually provide a mechanism for
reducing criticism of government policy. In a presentation to department
staff, then Deputy Minister of Community and Social Services, Charles
Pascal, stated that there is a tendency for government to approach the various
types of consultation with less than an open min.d. In fact, consultation is
often merely "an exercise in trying to get the public to see that w~ already
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have the right answer. ,,11 In light of this comment, concerns that a move by
government towards partnership might represent an effort to coopt
stakeholders and clients should not be unexpected.
The emphasis on partnership comes at a time in the federal sphere when
funding to public interest groups has been reduced. Many of these groups
have traditionally relied on funding for their operations. Some theorists argue
that these interest groups may instead be coopted into partnerships from
which it will be difficult to criticize government policy. Furthermore, while
this will be politically advantageous for government in the short-term, in the
long-term, the range of interests represented and public criticism will be
reduced.12
While it may be true that interest groups which participate in partnerships
will lose some of their independence and, therefore, their objectivity in areas
relating to the partnership, it is also true that partnerships allow the
representatives to participate in decision-making to a greater extent than they
had previously. Just as funding empowered these interests to criticize
government policy from outside of the policy process, partnerships empower
them by allowing them to exercise power within the decision-making
process. The fact remains, however, that once stakeholders are involved in
the process, it may not only become more difficult to criticize government
policy, but the focus of that criticism may change from the value of the
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policy itself to program delivery.
Prior to the establishment of the six partnerships under examination, a
variety of relationships existed between those individuals who later became
partners with the OMNR and the government. While the policy environment
surrounding the issue of park management in Algonquin Park was extremely
volatile and subject to intensive interest group activity, many of the
individuals appointed to either AFA staff positions or its board of directors
were not directly involved in the conflict. Exceptions to this were the
appointments of those board members who represented various conservation
and nature groups such as the Algonquin Wildlands League. In this
particular case, the government generally selected as partners individuals
noted for their scientific or business expertise and not for the interest which
they represented.
As the Authority has evolved, the selection of board members has
reflected a greater concern for issues of representation. Those individuals
interviewed felt that involvement in the partnership had provided them with
a greater level of understanding of both the mandates and constraints of
government and that this understanding better enabled them to criticize
government policy. It should be noted, however, that while representatives
of the Algonquin Wildlands League recognize the advances made by the
AFA, they maintain that the policy of provincial park harvesting is, in itself,
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a poor policy. Moreover, representatives of this interest group currently
express their opposition to provincial park policies from outside the
partnership.
The majority of the partners involved in the six partnership cases shared
the belief that 'knowledge is power' and that the partnerships allowed them
to attack government policy from a more informed and constructive
perspective. Most would not classify the nature of their relationship with
government as adversarial either before or during the partnership. All
partners interviewed maintained that the partnership had provided them with
a greater level of understanding, both of government and the other partners.
The few individuals or organizations which did admit to having a
confrontational history with the OMNR prior to the partnership were
concerned about the possibility of cooptation and usually resigned or
withdrew from the arrangement.
Power-Sharing and the Government-Stakeholder Relationship
As stated earlier in this chapter, the overall objective of partnership
arrangements is to democratize the decision-making process through
consultation and collaboration with non-governmental partners. A derivative
of this democratization is the empowerment of the partners. For partnership
arrangements to enhance democratic governance, therefore, they must
empower the partners. In addition, while there are obvious limitations to the
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use of subjective evaluations, successful empowerment must enhance the
partners' perceptions of their own efficacy.13
True partnership arrangements clearly empower the partners by sharing
decision-making authority. In consultative and operational partnerships, this
empowerment usually results from the ability of the partners to influence
decision-making. In some cases, however, operational or consultative
partnerships will evolve to allow a direct sharing of authority, or will allow
sufficient discretion to the partners in their operational capacity to permit
some decision-making responsibility.
In reality, however, governments have resisted innovative, risk-taking
initiatives, largely due to the conventions of ministerial responsibility and
public servant accountability. Furthermore, while one might expect
collaborative partnerships to involve the direct sharing of power and,
therefore, real empowerment, the placement of individual partnership
arrangements on the power continuum introduced in chapter two, varies
greatly. To determine the extent to which these arrangements actually
devolve power, therefore, requires an examination of the impact of
partnerships in practice.
The degree of empowerment which has resulted from the OMNR
partnerships was determined by considering the partners' perceptions of
empowerment, the amount of delegated or shared authority, the extent to
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which decisions are made consensually and whether the government retained
final decision-making authority. In all six cases overall responsibility for the
policy area in question was retained by the OMNR and, ultimately, the
Minister. In addition, participants in the arrangement agreed that decisions
were being made more consensually as a result of the partnerships, although
non-governmental partners involved in the Tupper/Shields Cooperative
Management Committee disagreed regarding the extent to which this change
had taken place.
Only the AFA and the Magpie Co-Management Committee illustrated
actual delegated or shared authority regarding policy oriented decisions. The
AFA is expected to make decisions which comply with government policy;
however, their discretion in this area has grown steadily since the Authority's
conception. Unlike the AFA, the Magpie Co-Management Committee was
not initially intended as a collaborative partnership and was not, therefore,
formally delegated any decision-making authority. Recent attempts to
increase the committee's level of responsibility have resulted in the partners
assuming a formal role within the timber management planning process.
Nevertheless, the OMNR retains final decision-making responsibility in this
area.
The AFA also displays a significant amount of authority regarding
operational decisions. While the scope of the responsibility is substantially
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smaller in the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site and the Goodyear Fishway
partnerships, the arrangements have resulted in authority being shared for
operational activities. In these cases, the OMNR acts as a 'rubber stamp'
providing verbal approval for proposed activities presented to them by the
partners. The WeIland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee has no
formally delegated authority for either policy or operational decisions. The
committee does exercise some influence, however, over decisions which are
ultimately made by the various government organizations.
The most impotent of the partnerships from the perspective of real power
sharing is the Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee. This
committee, while intended to be collaborative in nature, possesses no
decision-making authority; nor does it have any operational responsibilities.
The ability of the partners to influence either government or the forestry
companies is dependent on the willingness of representatives from these two
sectors to cooperate.
Despite the degree of actual power-sharing which exists within the
arrangements, the majority of the partners perceived that the partnership had
enhanced their own efficacy and increased their level of involvement in
public sector decision-making. A small number of participants in the
Tupper/Shields and the WeIland River partnerships maintained that while the
partnership had provided them with a better understanding of the roles and
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responsibilities of the other partners, it had done little to empower them or
make significant changes in the decision-making process.
Empowerment can, and should, be an obvious outcome of partnership
arrangements. Partners have access to planning processes which are usually
not accessible. Furthermore, non-governmental partners are provided with
information which enables them both to understand the decisions of
government and to criticize those decisions from a more informed
perspective. In the most collaborative relationships, decision-making
authority and the responsibility for that authority are formally delegated or
shared with the partners.
However, the extent to which real power-sharing occurs varies with the
type and nature of each individual partnership. It cannot be assumed that
arrangements which have been established with the intention of having public
organizations become 'full' partners with non-governmental organizations
actually empower the participants. Moreover, operational partnerships which
are limited in scope and provide little formally delegated decision-making
responsibility may devolve almost complete responsibility in a specific area,
thereby significantly altering the relationship between government and its
stakeholders.
Lastly, the perspective that a partnership enhances the ability of its
participants to participate in decision-making is linked to the consensual
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nature of decision-making and the degree to which, within a specified area,
the partners are allowed to assume responsibility. Partnership arrangements
with finite objectives such as the Goodyear Fishway, therefore, may yield far
greater levels of satisfaction among the partner~ than partnerships with a
broader scope but poorly defined roles and little delegated responsibility.
This chapter has considered the implications of partnership arrangements
on the constitutional conventions of ministerial responsibility and public
servant accountability, and on the nature of government-stakeholder
relationships. It has been illustrated that partnerships do not change the
fundamental accountability relationships between elected officials, public
servants and the public. However, the utilization of these arrangements may
potentially hinder the ability of ministers to identify clearly who is
responsible for which activities within government. It is imperative,
therefore, that accountability mechanisms appropriate to the level of
responsibility which is being shared are instituted and enforced. Suitable
accountability mechanisms have not been developed in at least three of the
partnership arrangements examined.
It has also been illustrated that in most cases, partnership arrangements
have successfully empowered non-governmental partners to varying degrees.
Where this empowerment has occurred, the relationship between government
139
understanding of the policy-making process.
majority feel that the relationship has improved their ability to provide
While some non-governmental partners maintain thatcollaborative.
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Chapter Seven
EVALUATING PARTNERSHIP SUCCESS
Within the public sector, partnership is quickly becoming a major
component in government's approach to problem solving. Partnerships
provide a mechanism for increasing the efficiency, effectiveness and
responsiveness of public organizations while engaging the public in the
process of priority setting, policy development and program delivery.
Because these arrangements have assumed such a high profile position among
the battery of management initiatives which may be pursued, it is important
that they be evaluated to determine their effectiveness, not only as a
problem-solving tool but also as an integral part of public management.
This chapter will provide criteria for measuring, and an assessment of, the
overall success of six OMNR partnership cases. Following this, various
characteristics which are associated with the positive outcome of partnership
arrangements will be outlined. Four of these characteristics, referred to as
success factors, will be evaluated to determine their impact on the outcome
of the six OMNR partnerships.
The last part of this chapter will examine some of the limitations on
partnership development within the public sector, with specific reference to
those values which guide the exercise of public business.
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Partnership Evaluation
It is difficult to assess the long-term value of partnership arrangements
due to their relatively recent appearance in the public sector. However, most
theorists agree that regular evaluations are necessary to maintain a partnership
successfully once the momentum which originally resulted in its
establishment diminishes.
Among the criteria which can be used to evaluate partnership
performance are effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness, for example, can
be measured as the ability of the partnership to satisfy the expectations of the
partners, or its success in meeting its stated objectives. Cost-benefit analysis
may be used to evaluate the degree of efficiency of a particular partnership
arrangement. Other criteria for evaluation might include the continued
commitment and participation of the partners, the ability of the partnership
to adapt to a changing environment and the extent to which the government-
stakeholder relationship has been altered. It is notable that the only OMNR
partnership for which an evaluation mechanism was developed was the
Algonquin Forestry Authority.
For the purpose of this thesis, partnership success will be evaluated
against the following criteria: a) the ability of the partnership to satisfy
generic objectives associated with partnership arrangements, b) the
effectiveness of the partnership, and c) the extent to which the partnership
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meets the expectations of the partners. A determination of the efficiency of
a particular arrangement was felt to be outside of the scope of this thesis.
As illustrated earlier in the thesis, the generic objective of partnership
arrangements is the democratization of decision-making. This can be
achieved by increasing the level of public participation in decision-making
and, ultimately, by empowering non-governmental partners. Empowerment
has both an objective and a subjective component. In chapter six, the degree
to which partnerships actually empowered the participants was determined by
assessing the amount of delegated or shared authority, the nature of decision-
making, and the subjective perception by the partners that their self-efficacy
had been enhanced as a result of the partnership. If the OMNR partnerships
. resulted in an increase in public participation in decision-making or the
empowerment of the partners, therefore, they are determined to have satisfied
the generic objective of partnerships.
Individual partnership arrangements are intended not only as a means of
empowering the partners, but also of meeting specific needs and satisfying
goals and objectives which are shared among the partners. A measure of the
effectiveness of partnerships, therefore, is the ability of the arrangement to
meet the stated objectives of the partnership, regardless of whether those
objectives are short-term and project-oriented, or long-term and broadly
based.
144
Secondly, effective partnerships must be capable of evolving to reflect
changes within the policy environment. This evolution may substantially
change the goals and objectives of the arrangement or the nature of the
partnership itself. This is the case in partnership arrangements which evolve
to become more collaborative as greater levels of responsibility are assumed
by the partners.
The third criterion for assessing the success of partnership arrangements
provides a subjective element to the evaluation. Partnerships cannot be
considered entirely successful if they do not meet the expectations of the
participants. The degree to which these expectations have been met is
expressed both in the opinions of the partners and in their continuing
participation in the partnership arrangement.
The Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site partnership was intended to solve
a myriad of problems, the most important of which were the need to satisfy
the interests of the public, to reduce the financial burden of maintaining the
site and to ensure the acceptance of necessary changes by stakeholders. By
soliciting direct public input and demonstrating its commitment to the public
participation process, the OMNR ensured a high degree of public ownership
of the solution and promoted a better understanding of public needs.
Furthermore, the financial objectives of the partnership have been exceeded
as maintenance and operational costs have been dramatically reduced since
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the partnership's conception.
The bulk of the decision-making authority associated with this site has
remained with the government. However, within the scope of the operational
responsibilities which the March of Dimes has assumed, they exercise an
increasing amount of discretion. Moreover, the extent to which the public
determined the outcome of the site by responding to the survey distributed
by the District, enabled them to become true 'partners' in the planning stage
of the partnership. This participation in planning and the responsibility for
site operation have satisfied the expectations of the partners and have
empowered them, albeit in a limited area. Clearly, the Trout Lake Waste
Disposal partnership can be considered a success on the basis of the three
assessment criteria being considered. The OMNR dramatically reduced its
financial burden while empowering the stakeholders and, in doing so, created
a model facility which is being duplicated at other locations both inside and
outside the Thunder Bay District.
The second operational partnership, namely the Goodyear Fishway, is
also considered a successful partnership. The O¥NR faced growing public
displeasure, as well as fiscal and human resource restrictions which limited
its ability to deal with the problem present in the Bowmanville Creek. In this
particular case, the impetus for the arrangement came from the BCAA;
however, the OMNR displayed a commitment to cooperative management in
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its acceptance and support of the proposal as well as In its financial
contribution to the project.
While the OMNR retains final decision-making authority for the facility,
the BCAA is given substantial discretion in deciding when the fishway will
operate. In addition, the fact that the BCAA was almost entirely responsible
for soliciting funds for the project, and was involved in the fishways
construction, has resulted in a sense of ownership of the facility and
participation in government program development. The partnership has
provided both the OMNR and the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans
with a facility they could otherwise not afford, and has satisfied public
demands for improved recreational opportunities.
The Magpie Forest conflict presented the government with a different
set of problems than the preceding operational partnerships. The majority of
these problems revolved around the issues of communication, participation,
and responsiveness. The OMNR initially attempted to resolve the conflicts
within the confines of existing procedures, such as the timber management
planning amendment process. However, these procedures did not allow for
adequate participation by fragmented and seasonal stakeholders such as the
remote tourism operators. Years of conflict resulted in a general mistrust by
the tourism operators not only of the other groups but also of the OMNR,
which was perceived as conducting unbalanced planning which neither
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responded to client needs nor truly encouraged stakeholder participation.
The OMNR responded to this situation by establishing a consultative
partnership in which the Magpie Forest Co-management Committee also
assumed some operational responsibilities. While the government retains
decision-making authority for all resource management decisions within the
Magpie Forest, the consensual nature of the committee's recommendations
make any attempts by the OMNR to disregard the recommendations difficult.
As a result, the partners have become a vital part of the policy-making
process. Furthermore, as the committee members have become more
experienced in dealing with resource management issues, their role has
evolved to become a more formal part of timber management planning.
Participants in the Magpie Co-management Committee have assumed
ownership of the problems within the forest as well as their solutions. In
doing so, most of the partners have accepted personal responsibility for the
operational projects undertaken by the committee and have derived a great
deal of satisfaction from their completion. With the exception of two of the
original committee members, all of the partners continue to participate in the
partnership on a regular basis and express a willingness to assume greater
levels of responsibility.
One of the few problems associated with this partnership relates to the
expiration of OMNR funding for the Remote Tourist Industry Association
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(RTIA) and the tourism coordinator. While discussions regarding the
reestablishment of this association are ongoing, no decisions have been made
either by the OMNR or by representatives of the industry. If the interests of
this industry are to recognized, accommodations must be made to assist them
in remaining organized. Nevertheless, this partnership is clearly an example
of successful collaboration between the government and its stakeholders.
The WeIland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee represents
a proactive attempt by the government to establish a government-stakeholder
partnership. Established by the Ministry of the Environment, this partnership
attempts to address a significant environmental problem, namely the
contamination of the WeIland River and specifically the Atlas reef, through
a process of consultation and partnership with both governmental and non-
governmental partners.
The arrangement has provided the cleanup project with a degree of
coordination and cooperation not often present in projects which cross
departmental boundaries. In addition, by providing a forum for public input
into the planning, the committee does, in theory, provide greater levels of
public participation in the process. One of the problems associated with this
participation, however, is the degree of access provided to the public.
Members of the public were not invited to participate in the committee.
Rather, individuals were hand-picked and personally approached by Acres
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and the MOE. Furthermore, these individuals did not formally represent any
specific interests, nor did they have any forum for communicating their
involvement in the planning process to the public.
Nevertheless, the individuals involved in the committee are able to
exercise some influence over the recommendations being made and can
participate in the planning of the project to a greater extent than before.
Much of this influence results from the presense of representatives from the
various public agencies which exercise direct control over the cleanup project
and their willingness to seek solutions which satisfy the interests of the
majority, if not all, of the partners.
All of the original partners continue to be involved in this arrangement,
and while the majority express satisfaction with the progress achieved, a
number of partners maintain that this progress has been slow and is limited
by the reluctance of the MOE to enforce regulations relating to the
remediation of contaminated waterways. In fact, the partnership was initially
intended as an ad hoc committee which would plan and oversee the
remediation of the Atlas reef only. The scope of the committee's mandate
has evolved, therefore, to reflect the changing nature of the problem. Their
progress cannot proceed further, however, without either funding from some,
or all, of the partners, or formally delegated authority which would enable the
committee to direct the actual cleanup of the river.
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An assessment of this particular partnership indicates that the arrangement
has experienced limited success in meeting its objectives or satisfying the
generic objectives of partnership agreements. The assessment of the
committee's success by the partners is slightly more positive, but remains
limited.
Of the six OMNR partnership arrangements studied, the Tupper/Shields
Cooperative Management Committee has been. the least successful. This
partnership was established to resolve both a short-term conflict and the
longer-term objective of co-managing the natural resources within the
development of an access road into an area with substantial tourism and
recreational value. The long-term issue, however, focuses on the land use
planning decisions outlined in the District Land Use Guideline (DLUG).
Herein lies the basis for one of the major problems associated with this
particular partnership. The committee deals with the issues surrounding
resource management in the Tupper/Shields area within the scope of the
timber management planning process. This process presumes the acceptance
of the guidelines for land use planning which are provided in the DLUG.
Many of the partners, however, rejected these guidelines as well as the basic
assumption that forest harvesting should continue in an area with such
significant recreational value.
Tupper/Shields area. The short-term conflict revolved around the
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Despite the philosophical differences between the partners, the committee
may have been able to approach the issue of forest management in a manner
which satisfied the stakeholders, had the goals and objectives of the
partnership been clearly defined and had they reflected the interests of all the
partners. As the terms of reference establishing the partnership were not
satisfactory to all the partners, the foundation was laid for continued conflict
between the partners.
The committee enjoys no formal authority or responsibility for planning
or decision-making regarding the management area despite the fact that the
terms of reference identify the committee as a full partner to the OMNR.
Meetings are not conducted based on any rules of order, and while consensus
is sought, it is seldom achieved. The influence which dissenting partners do
possess is entirely dependent on the goodwill of either the OMNR or
representatives of the forest industry.
To the extent that industry and government have been willing to listen
and to compromise, we can consider that the remaining stakeholders have
been empowered. However, this empowerment has been limited and remains
very tenuous in that no formal basis for this stakeholder empowerment exists.
In addition, none of the non-governmental partners perceive this arrangement
as altering, in any substantial way, their own efficacy in the decision-making
process; nor do they feel the partnership provides a balanced reflection of the
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stakeholder interests. Lastly, in the face of growing dissension regarding the
partnership, the OMNR has resisted efforts to alter the committee's mandate,
format or authority.
The Algonquin Forestry Authority (AFA) is a final example of a
partnership which has met both the generic objectives associated with
partnership arrangements and the specific objectives for which it was
established. The Authority was intended to address a number of concerns,
including satisfying the demands by lobby groups for greater involvement in
the management of Algonquin Park and managing the Park in a manner
which was both financially and environmentally sound. Furthermore, the
government had to find a solution which would alleviate a number of
administrative problems, coordinate the management of the park, and provide
some distance between the OMNR and the contentious issues surrounding
park management while still maintaining some degree of control.
While the government retains final decision-making authority regarding
provincial park management in general, and management within Algonquin
Park specifically, the AFA possesses a significant amount of responsibility
and decision-making authority. Moreover, this authority has expanded as the
partnership has progressed and increasing operational responsibilities have
been delegated to the AFA by the OMNR. The resistance of OMNR field
level staff and of some senior managers to the e~panding role of the AFA
153
bears witness to the degree of real power-sharing which has resulted from
this partnership.
Stakeholders who at one time lobbied the government regarding
management of the Park from outside the policy making process, now have
formally delegated authority and are able to exercise that authority from
within the process. As a result, the level of satisfaction expressed by the
partners is extremely high, although some dissatisfaction exists among the
more vocal lobbyists who were originally involved with the AFA. Only one
stakeholder organization, namely the Algonquin Wildlands League, has
chosen to remove itself from direct involvement in the AFA. In addition,
general levels of public concern regarding the management of the Park have
been substantially reduced.
All of the administrative problems associated with conflicting physical
boundaries and multiple forest operators have been eliminated as a result of
the partnership. The actual management of the Park has been lauded as an
"environmental model" by a number of organizations, including the
Algonquin Wildlands League. Lastly, the OMNR, while no longer directly
involved in forest harvesting within the Park, maintains sufficient control of
its management to ensure that the public interest continues to be served.
An evaluation of the success of the six OMNR partnership cases reveals
that four of the partnerships have been extremely successful in meeting their
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objectives and empowerIng their stakeholders. The extent of this
empowerment has varied, however, depending on the type of partnership and
the scope of its responsibilities. The WeIland River Cleanup Project
partnership has had more limited success in this area, but remains a viable
partnership which requires some modifications in its mandate and authority
to continue successfully.
In terms of the three criteria used in this thesis, the Tupper/Shields
Cooperative Management Committee cannot be considered an example of a
successful partnership. Nevertheless, this arrangement reflects an attempt by
the government to incorporate the interests of stakeholders into the decision-
making process. The problems associated with this particular arrangement
revolve primarily around its original concept and the selection of the
participants themselves although a number of other difficulties, including a
lack of committment and formalization, are evident.
Partnership Success Factors
In light of the recent nature of partnership arrangements in the public
sector and the lack of comprehensive studies of these initiatives, it is difficult
to prescribe those conditions which are critical to successful partnership.
Nevertheless, there are a number of factors which theorists and practitioners
of public management suggest contribute to a partnership's success. Loreto
states that the primary requirements for successful partnership include a good
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concept, commitment, and champions. Kanter, on the other hand, provides
several success attributes which focus on the concepts of commitment,
power-equality and formalization of the partnership.1
Many factors contribute to the success or failure of a partnership
arrangement. Furthermore, the significance of these factors changes
according to the type of partnership being established. For example, it has
been suggested that the equality of the partners is fundamental to successful
partnership. However, this factor is much more salient in collaborative
partnerships in which real power-sharing and the devolution of authority
occur than in arrangements in which a non-governmental partner assumes
limited responsibility for a specific program or project.
The four success factors being considered in this thesis include: i) an
equitable balance of power, ii) commitment, iii) limited objectives, and iv)
formalization. It has been suggested that an equitable power structure,
based on the interdependence of the partners, would enable all the partners
to influence decisions, thereby ensuring an effective and enduring
partnership.2 In many cases, however, the government remains dominant in
the partnership by virtue of its legal authority or resources. In these cases,
it is necessary that there be a recognition of those resources which the other
partners bring to the partnership. These values might include expertise,
capital, public influence, or credibility. Equity is illustrated by such factors
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as the articulation of the partners' interests within the objectives of the
partnership, and the power that each partner brings to the table or exercises
within the partnership.
Partnerships cannot be entirely successful if they do not have the support
and commitment of all the partners. This commitment is based on the
shared values and goals which form the foundation of the agreement.
Partners must feel that the partnership is theirs and that they can influence
its evolution. Commitment must also be reflected in tangible ways such as
the provision of financial and/or human resources,3 as well as a willingness
to modify policy or program delivery In accordance with the
recommendations of the partnership.
Partnerships which exhibit a narrow scope and limited objectives are
presumed to be easier to establish and maintain successfully than those which
are more broadly focused. It is suggested that these partnerships require
fewer partners and resources and have results which are more visible and
easily measurable.4 These partnerships also tend to be shorter in duration
due to the limited nature of their objectives.
The last success factor being considered, formalization, implies that the
more formalized a partnership is, the greater the likelihood that it will be
successfully maintained. Partnerships can be formalized in a variety of ways,
including legal agreements or terms of reference, clearly defined roles and
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responsibilities and corresponding accountability relationships, and
organizational structures such as committees. This formalization helps to
maintain partnerships which are inherently fragile in nature. 5
An equitable power structure is clearly evident in only one of the
partnerships examined, namely the Algonquin Forestry Authority. Four of the
remaining partnership arrangements illustrate power structures which are
unequal due to the retention of decision-making authority by the government
and the often unorganized nature of the non-governmental organizations.
Nevertheless, these partnerships reflect an acknowledgement by the majority
of the partners of the other partners' contributions and display an attempt by
the dominant partner not to exercise control over the partnership. In addition,
the objectives of these arrangements reflect the interests of all the partners.
The Tupper/Shields partnership is the only arrangement in which significant
power inequities exist. This appears to be largely a result of a lack of
delegated representation and the inability of many of the partners to influence
either the public or the other partners. Furthermore, this inequity is reflected
in the terms of reference for the committee, which do not adequately
represent the interests of all the partners.
Formalization appears to play a more significant role in partnerships in
which greater levels of power-sharing occur. The Trout Lake, Magpie Forest
and AFA partnerships all exhibited a high degree of formalization and
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involve real power-sharing within the scope of the partnership. Both the
Trout Lake and the AFA partnerships are defined by legal agreements.
Clearly the AFA is the most formalized of the six partnership arrangements,
having been established by an act of the legislature and having clearly
defined roles, responsibilities and accountability. relationships outlined in
various legal or policy documents. The Magpie Forest Co-management
Committee is formalized by explicit terms of reference in which the
committee's goals and objectives, as well as the roles and responsibilities of
the partners, are established. In addition, the committee structure itself
further formalizes this partnership as do the procedures followed during
committee meetings and its inclusion in the terms of reference for the new
TMP.
The remaining three partnerships are more informal in nature, having no
clearly defined guidelines. The Goodyear Fishway, in particular, is based on
an informal oral agreement between OMNR staff and representatives of the
Bowmanville Anglers Association. This particular partnership, however, also
exhibits a very narrow scope and is oriented towards a single, short-term
project.
High levels of commitment, on the part of all the partners, are evident in
all the partnerships, with the exception of the Tupper/Shields Cooperative
Management Committee. In each of the five successful partnerships,
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government has illustrated its commitment to the arrangement by its
willingness to act on the recommendations which result from the partnerships.
Furthermore, all of the partners have committed either human or financial
resources to the partnerships and the majority express satisfaction with, and
ownership of, the outcome of the partnerships. The Tupper/Shields
partnership does not reflect the same degree of commitment by the partners,
especially those partners not representing either government or industry.
Examination of the six partnerships indicates ,that narrow objectives do,
in fact, make easier the task of establishing a partnership. The Trout Lake,
Goodyear Fishway and WeIland River partnerships had relatively narrow
objectives and presented few problems in determining which stakeholders
should be involved and the scope of the arrangements. The remaining
partnerships had goals and objectives which were far broader, and perhaps
longer term in nature. As a result, establishing the partnerships required more
care to ensure that all significant stakeholders were represented and their roles
and responsibilities clearly outlined. As discussed earlier, the effort required
to establish the Tupper/Shields partnership did not ensure either clearly
defined roles and responsibilities or the partnership's success.
It is unclear, however, whether narrow objectives result in partnerships
which are more likely to be successful and which are easier to maintain once
established. The Magpie Forest and the AFA partnerships are both broadly
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focused and reflect mandates in which substantial responsibility is conferred
on the partners. These two partnerships have clearly been successful in
achieving their objectives and do not appear to be in any jeopardy. While it
may be more difficult initially to satisfy broad objectives such as those
addressed in the Magpie and AFA partnerships, once a partnership has been
established successfully, long term maintenance of these arrangements may
be no more difficult than maintaining partnerships with limited objectives.
The conclusion may be drawn that the formality of the partnership, the
accountability framework and the ability of a partnership to evolve in
response to a changing environment are perhaps more salient when addressing
partnership maintenance.
Limitations to Public Sector Partnerships
The popularity of partnerships as a strategic management tool is
undeniable in both the public and the private sectors. However, the
environment within which public administrators must function is drastically
different than that of their counterparts in the private sector. The question we
must address is whether there are factors which limit the implementation of
partnership arrangements within the public sector.
The management of government is subject .to a variety of rules and
regulations which do not typically apply to private sector organizations.
These rules result from the fact that public organizations in Canada are part
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of a democratic political system. Public managers, therefore, must operate
in a complex world of political, managerial and ethical values.6
In considering the establishment of a partnership arrangement, the public
servant must be cognizant of those values which define public sector
management. Partnerships offer the flexibility that is sometimes needed to
deal with complex issues such as the environment, but the scope of
innovation must be limited to some degree by the nature of public business.
The impact which a partnership may have on the maintenance of values such
as consistency, fairness, prudence, and probity may limit the degree to which
government is willing to share authority.
Furthermore, the political framework within which public business occurs
will determine the extent to which government is willing to assume the risks
which are associated with partnership agreements. Politicians may be
unwilling to accept the potential for credibility pro'blems should they become
partners with unacceptable organizations, or for the political backlash
associated with a partnership which has 'gone wrong'. Issues such as a loss
of political control, the possible subordination of the public interest, legal
liability and conflict of interest must be considered prior to establishing a
partnership within the public sector.
The possibility that partnerships may complicate bureaucratic and political
accountability was discussed in chapter six. The public's need to hold
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government responsible for its actions must certainly limit the empowerment
potential of public sector partnerships. For example, the OMNR is still
responsible for all operations at the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site and must
ensure, therefore, that the March of Dimes complies with Ministry of the
Environment regulations. This responsibility restricts the degree to which the
OMNR will be willing to devolve decision-making authority for the site.
Governments must decide how far a public sector partnership can and should
go towards real power-sharing and what types of accountability mechanisms
should be instituted to ensure that accountability for public business
continues.
Public sector partnerships may also be limited by public expectations
regarding the role of government. Partnerships can be viewed by the public
as either promoting external empowerment or as a means of offloading
government responsibilities.? Government will be less likely to enter into
partnership arrangements or to become involved in real power-sharing if
these arrangements are perceived negatively.
This chapter has considered the issue of partnership success and the
limitations to this success within the public sector. An examination of the six
OMNR partnership cases reveals that the only partnership which can be
considered to have failed to meet both its own objectives and the generic
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objectives associated with partnership arrangements was the Tupper/Shields
Cooperative Management Committee. The WeIland River Cleanup Project
Planning Committee has had limited success while the remaining four
partnerships have been very successfully established and maintained.
An examination of four attributes which have been considered necessary
to successful partnership illustrated that an equitable power structure, the
commitment of all the partners and the formalization of the partnership play
a significant role in determining the outcome of an arrangement. The impact
of limited objectives on partnership outcome was unclear.
The final section of this chapter outlined a number of potential limitations
to successful partnership within the public sector. These limitations include
the political, managerial and ethical environment within which government
must function. In addition, public sector partnership may be limited by the
unwillingness of elected officials to devolve power and responsibility or to
assume the risks associated with partnership arrangements. Issues such as the
ability of the public to hold government accountable for its actions and public
expectations regarding the role of government may also limit the participation
of the government in this type of management initiative.
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Chapter Eight
CONCLUSIONS
Efforts to reform the public sector are not confined to Canada. Rather,
these efforts have become a priority in many governments around the world,
reflecting common themes which have surfaced within the political, social
and economic environments of their respective communities. Paramount
among these themes is the increasing desire of the public for more consensual
decision-making, frustration with government and its programs, ,the impact
of new technology and scarce public resources. The result of these forces has
been an emphasis within government on providing better quality public
service with fewer resources.
Partnerships have provided government with an opportunity to address the
complex problems it faces by changing its role to reflect the new realities of
governance rather than expanding its responsibilities. This thesis has
explored partnership arrangements to determine both their value in the public
sector and their potential impact on government. Specifically, six partnership
arrangements involving the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources have been
examined, with observations being applied to the general use of partnership
by, or involving, government.
This concluding chapter will provide a summary of the data and
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arguments presented in the preceding chapters and will relate this material to
the six hypotheses outlined in chapter one. The final section of this chapter
will present a number of recommendations which may be useful in the
establishment and maintenance of these agreements.
SUMMARY AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
An introduction to the concept and practice of partnership and an
overview of attempts at public sector reform were presented in chapter one.
An outline of the thesis, its intent and research methodology and a summary
of the content of the remaining chapters was provided. Six hypotheses
relating to the overall success of partnership arrangements, their political
implications and potential success factors guided the development of the
thesis.
Chapter two elaborated on the subject of partnership by providing a
working definition of the concept as well as definitions of partnership types
and their associated criteria. The term partnership has often been used
loosely and incorrectly to describe arrangements which involve neither
power-sharing nor a genuine attempt by government to increase public
participation in decision-making. Partnerships were defined in this thesis as
relationships involving the sharing of power, work, support and/or
information for the achievement of joint goals and/or compatible benefits.
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Because partnership arrangements must be tailored to suit specific
circumstances, it is inherently difficult to classify them according to
preestablished criteria. Nevertheless, partnership categories provide a
framework within which comparisons and an assessment of success can be
made. The four partnership categories presented in this thesis are based on
the partnership's purpose and the nature and extent of power exercised by the
partners. These categories include collaborative, consultative, operational,
and contributory partnerships, each category involving less power-sharing
than the preceding category. The analysis of OMNR partnerships does not
include examples of contributory partnerships, as these arrangements involve
no operational or decision-making responsibilities and are least likely to alter
the power-sharing relationship between government and stakeholders. It was
noted that specific partnerships may satisfy criteria associated with more than
one category or may evolve from one category to another as the partnership
progresses.
Another approach to partnership classification introduced within the thesis
considers a partnership continuum on which placement of a particular
arrangement would depend on criteria such as the extent of power being
shared by the partners or, conversely, being retained by government. While
this approach was not utilized when evaluating the six OMNR partnerships,
it was illustrated that a partnership continuum of this nature would
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compensate for variations in delegated power which may exist within one
category type.
It was demonstrated that partnerships have assumed a high profile
position among innovations both at the federal and the provincial levels of
government. Within Ontario specifically, partnerships have become a part of
the provincial strategy for increasing public participation in policy-making.
Public officials within the various provincial ministries are being innundated
with the language of partnership during professional development training,
seminars and committee discussions. The popularity of partnership is
reflected in the growing number of staff assigned to partnership development
positions and committees such as the Inter-ministerial Partnership Network.
Nevertheless, the fragility of these relationships necessitates a thorough
evaluation to determine their applicability in the public sector.
The OMNR has included partnership development in its policy and
strategy document for the 1990's. While this ministry has been involved in
"working relationships" for years, the current emphasis appears to reflect a
more consensual, less paternal philosophy regarding resource policy
development. The Ministry has clearly displayed commitment to a proactive
philosophy by establishing a partnership task force and developing a policy
framework within which partnerships should be established. However, it was
demonstrated that while the OMNR has illustrated its commitment to the
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partnership philosophy, it has fallen behind in its implementation. The many
partnership arrangements which exist across the province are largely the result
of initiatives by field level staff faced with resource constraints or significant
management problems. Furthermore, while the partnership policy framework
was intended to provide guidelines and 'best practices' to Ministry staff
establishing such an arrangement, most staff associated with the six cases
were unaware of the document or its contents. For this reason, many of the
partnerships established are lacking attributes such as accountability
mechanisms which were considered vitally important by the partnership task
force.
District staff exhibited a poor understanding of what constitutes a
partnership involving real power-sharing. In addition, the OMNR has not
dealt with the overriding question, "How far should power-sharing go?". In
deferring the resolution of this issue, they have perhaps limited their ability
to exploit fully the benefits of partnership.
Operational and consultative partnerships are by far the most predominant
types with the OMNR despite its declaration that it intends to pursue
partnerships in which more than just work is shared. Collaborative
arrangements are extremely scarce and many partnerships which District staff
felt were collaborative in nature better represented examples of consultative
partnership. Contributory partnerships are fairly new to the OMNR and
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measurable results.
Collaborative
Collaborative
Consultative
Consultative
Operational
Operational
its objectives regarding power-sharing and public participation, two
partnerships. Furthermore, these arrangements usually provided for easily
To examine, in greater detail, how successfully the OMNR has achieved
represent a small proportion of their overall partnership arrangements.
As a general rule, collaborative partnerships were established with fewer
partners than consultative partnerships. Operational arrangements exhibited
sometimes shorter in duration than either consultative or collaborative
no clear trend regarding the number of partners. This type of arrangement
tended to have very specific, project-oriented objectives which were
Descriptive analysis regarding each of the cases was provided in chapters
partnerships representing each of the three main partnership categories were
relationship and the degree of success achieved, and to test the hypotheses
three, four and five. The partnerships were then evaluated on the basis of
various criteria to determine their impact on the government-stakeholder
evaluated as follows:
Partnership
Algonquin Forestry Authority
Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee
Magpie Co-management Committee
WeIland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee
Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site
Goodyear Fishway
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outlined in chapter one. Each of these hypotheses IS examined In the
following pages.
While partnership agreements blur the practice ofaccountability, they
do not alter the formal accountability relationships in government
today.
In general, it was demonstrated that partnership arrangements do not, in
themselves, alter the fundamental accountability relationships that exist
between politicians, public officials and the public. Ministers are still
responsible for the activities of their departments and the decisions of their
subordinates. Moreover, public servants remain accountable to their superiors
and, ultimately, to their Minister.
Despite the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility, current
practice dictates that ministers not be held personally responsible, to the
extent that they resign, for errors occurring within their departments of which
they had no personal knowledge. The implementation of partnerships by
public officials, therefore, will not result in greater ministerial resignations
unless the personal culpability of a minister can be associated with an
administrative error resulting from the partnerships.
However, ministers are considered to be responsible for the activities of
their departments to the extent that they investigate errors, take corrective
action and report to Parliament or the legislature regarding the actions of their
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subordinates. It was concluded that partnerships do limit, in a number of
ways, the ability of ministers to answer for their departments. Clearly, any
delegation of decision-making authority to individuals outside the public
service must result in logistical difficulties when attempting to identify those
responsible for errors. Furthermore, the involvement of people outside the
government makes administrative continuity difficult. A minister's ability to
answer for the activities of his or her subordinates depends on this continuity.
It is imperative, therefore, that accountability mechanisms be established to
counteract the impact of partnership on the practical application of political
and bureaucratic accountability.
Accountability mechanisms were successfully implemented in the
establishment of the Algonquin Forestry Authority. However, appropriate
mechanisms were not evident in the remaining five partnership cases. It is
assumed that the development of accountability mechanisms in the AFA
partnership reflects the substantially greater degree of authority which was
delegated to that partnership.
It was also demonstrated that there are a number of other political
implications associated with partnership development which must be
addressed by elected officials and public servants. Issues such as loss of
political control, the possible subordination of the public interest, legal
liability for the outcome of the partnership and conflict of interest are but a
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few. Positive implications included the political benefits of reduced tensions
between government and stakeholders and the synergistic effect of combined
resources evidenced by the establishment of the Magpie Forest and Trout
Lake partnerships.
Analysis of the SIX OMNR partnerships also indicates that these
arrangements contribute to the politicization of bureaucrats. Public officials
involved in these partnerships have the difficult task of juggling the partners'
interests. In doing so, they assume authoritative responsibility for allocating
scarce resources.
Partnerships can make criticism of government policy difficult by
making government critics a 'part of the process. '
An examination of the the impact of the partnerships on the ability of
non-governmental partners to criticize government policy demonstrated that
while interest groups may lose some of their independence when involved in
partnerships, they also enjoy greater levels of participation in decision-
making. The majority of the partners felt that their involvement in the
partnership provided them with greater access to information and better
opportunities to influence public sector management. In addition, most felt
that 'knowledge is power', and this knowledge is only available by virtue of
their involvement inside the policy-making process. Furthermore, the
majority of the partners who had previously criticised government policy
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continued to do so, although the nature of that criticism was less adversarial.
Public sector partnerships which result in real power-sharing are
infrequent and usually develop in an environment subject to political
pressure and/or intensive interest group activity.
All of the partnerships, with the exception of the Tupper/Shields
Cooperative Management Committee, successfully empowered the
participants, although to varying degrees. The only partnership in which
decision-making authority was formally delegated to the partnership was the
Algonquin Forestry Authority. The social and political environment within
which this partnership was established exhibited, by far, the most intensive
lobbying by interest groups, and high levels of public awareness as illustrated
by the CBC television special highlighting Algonquin Park. As a result of
this lobbying and public interest, the Minister of Natural Resources and the
provincial Premier experienced significant pressure to resolve the situation.
In all cases, overall responsibility for the policy area has remained with
the government and, ultimately, the Minister. However, decisions are being
made more consensually, and the participants perceive their involvement and
their ability to influence policy in a positive light. Where partnerships have
progressed successfully, such as in the case of the Magpie Forest Co-
management Committee, the government has exhibited a willingness to
devolve greater levels of authority and to permit more power-sharing.
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Partnership agreements can work if they are developed with care and
commitment.
It was demonstrated that five of the six partnerships successfully satisfied
both the generic objectives associated with partnership and the specific goals
and objectives for which the partnership was established. In addition, these
partnerships have met the expectations of the majority of the partners. The
Trout Lake, Magpie Forest and Algonquin Forestry Authority partnerships are
particularly successful. Each of these partnerships has evolved as the
arrangement has progressed to provide greater levels of power-sharing and/or
a greater degree of formalization for the partnership itself.
The Trout Lake, Magpie Forest and Algonquin Forestry Authority
partnerships were also established with the greatest care, utilizing legal
supporting documents where applicable. In both the Magpie Forest and the
Algonquin Forestry Authority partnerships, significant attention was given to
the selection of the participants to ensure that all major stakeholders were
represented and that the appropriate mix of human resources was provided.
It is interesting to note that these three partnerships represent each of the
three partnership categories, indicating that partnership success depends less
on the type of partnership and more on its establishment and implementation.
The Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee, however, was
found to be lacking in a variety of ways, especially in the ability of the
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partners to compromise in the achievement of their objectives. Furthermore,
this partnership illustrates the dangers associated with inadequate planning
during the establishment of the partnership. The result has been a partnership
based on principles and objectives which are not acceptable to all the
participants, and a relationship among the partners which, at best, is
adversarial.
The care which should be taken when establishing a partnership
arrangement must also be present for the duration of the arrangement. The
fragility of these alliances necessitates nurturing and on-going evaluation to
facilitate their evolution as the environment within which they function
changes.
Partnerships which have been developed with a fairly equitable
balance of power and/or a high level of commitment by all the
partners are more likely to succeed.
It was acknowledged that many factors contribute to the success or failure
of a partnership, and that the significance of these factors varies depending
on the type of partnership endeavor. Nevertheless, an examination of the six
partnership cases illustrated that an equitable balance of power or the
accommodation of a power imbalance was present in all five successful
partnerships. Where an imbalance occurs, the partners exhibit an appreciation
of the contributions of the weaker partners, and do not exercise control over
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the partnership. The dominant partner can modify this imbalance by
occupying a single seat and a corresponding single vote on committees,
ensuring that their resources are shared with the remaining partners and that
partnership objectives reflect the interests of all the partners.
Furthermore, it was concluded that the commitment of all the partners
plays a significant role in determining a partnership's outcome. In each of the
five successful partnerships, both the government and the non-governmental
partners exhibited high levels of commitment to the partnership as well as its
objectives. This commitment was evidenced by such factors as the
willingness of the government to accept recommendations or decisions
resulting from the arrangement, the commitment of human or financial
resources, and the continued participation of the partners.
Partnerships with fairly narrow objectives and which have been
formalized in some way are more likely to succeed.
It was demonstrated that partnerships in which greater levels of power-
sharing occur also tend to be more formal in structure and, occasionally, are
defined by legal documentation or legislation. The Algonquin Forestry
Authority, for example, was established by legislation and its responsibilities
outlined within a number of legal documents. Formalization does not appear
to affect the outcome of arrangements such as the Goodyear Fishway, in
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which the goals are project oriented and very specific and the number of
partners involved is limited. While it was unclear whether narrow objectives
result in partnerships which are more likely to succeed, it was illustrated that
this success factor did result in partnerships which were easier to establish.
Finally, it was illustrated that the ability of the government to enter into,
and enjoy the benefits of, partnership arrangements is limited by the very
nature of public business. Values such as consistency, fairness, prudence and
probity define the exercise of authority by public servants. However, the
characteristics of partnership may not always be compatible with these values.
Moreover, the political implications of power-sharing and the impact which
partnerships may have on the practical application of political and
bureaucratic accountability may restrict the degree to which real power-
sharing can occur.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations have been developed to assist
government in establishing and maintaining successful partnerships. These'
recommendations apply to partnership policy within a government
organization as well as the planning and establishment of such arrangements.
It is not intended that they be considered a comprehensive summary of all
issues which should be considered when entering into partnership.
Government organizations should develop a policy fr&mework within
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which partnership development can occur. The Ontario Ministry of Natural
Resources has developed such a framework in the form of the partnership
policy statement developed by the Partnerships Taskforce. However, this
document should include recommended accountability mechanisms and
evaluation procedures, which could be utilized by staff entering into a
partnership agreement. Furthermore, the issue of how far a public sector
partnership can and should go towards real power-sharing must be addressed
so that guidelines and boundaries can be established and applied to new
partnerships.
Governments must also ensure that public servants are familiar with the
policy direction provided within this framework. Appropriate human resource
training should be provided to the extent that management staff have a clear
understanding of the intent and purpose of partnership, procedures for their
establishment, and requirements for success. Skills such as the ability of
managers to communicate effectively and to pursue innovative management
techniques should be recognized and valued.
When planning a partnership, consideration must be given to its legal,
financial and administrative implications as well as the potential political risks
associated with the sharing of power. Furthermore, public servants
considering such arrangements should ensure that the foundation for the
agreement itself is valid. A faulty concept which does not adequately address
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the concerns or issues at hand will not succeed in meeting its objectives or
satisfying the expectations of the partners.
When selecting the partners, consideration should be gIven to their
willingness and ability to communicate, cooperate and compromise. The
right mix of human resources can accommodate shortcomings in other areas
of the partnership. However, an inappropriate mix of partners will make
success within the partnership difficult. In addition, access to the partnership
should be as equitable as possible. Representation which has been delegated
by various interest groups will also aid in assuring a degree of validity and
accountability for the partnership.
While it is recognized that the degree of formalization required by a
partnership will vary depending on the nature and type of arrangement, some
degree of supporting documentation should be provided. This formalization
may take the form of memoranda of understanding, terms of reference, or
legal documentation. Where terms of reference or management plans are
provided they should be as specific as possible, identifying accountability
mechanisms and evaluation procedures. Furthermore, the goals and
objectives of the partnership should reflect the interests of all the partners to
ensure their continued commitment to the partnership. If possible, these
documents should be developed consensually by all the partn~rs. If this is
not possible, acceptance of the terms and conditions of the partnership' must
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be ensured.
Partnership goals and objectives should be as measureable as possible.
While it is sometimes difficult to identify tangible means for assessing the
progress of a partnership, participants will respond more favourably to the
partnership if they are able to gauge their success in achieving the objectives
of the partnership. Some partnerships, such as consultative arrangements,
may benefit from the inclusion of operational responsibilities with tangible
results within the scope of the agreement.
To ensure the substantive involvement of all the partners, participants
should be provided with some initial training where their expertise or
understanding of the policy area is lacking. The unfamiliarity of non-
governmental partners with the processes and procedures of government often
delays the progress of the partnership. Moreover, providing this training
communicates to non-governmental partners that government is committed
to the endeavour of partnership.
The issue of commitment is significant to all the participants in a
partnership. However, it is perhaps most important that government display
its commitment so that partners do not perceive the arrangement simply as
an opportunity to 'sell government policy' or to discharge government
responsibility. Government can illustrate this commitment in tangible ways
such as providing financial and human resources, accepting and acting on
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recommendations which result from the partnership and delegating real
responsibility to the partners.
Lastly, an attempt should be made by government to reduce any
inequalities in the power structure of the partnership. It is imperative that all
partners perceive that the partnership belongs to them and that they are
capable of affecting its outcome. If one partner, namely the government,
remains dominant and exercises control over the partnership, the partners will
feel ineffectual and, consequently, less committed to the arrangement. Power
inequities can be accommodated by providing training to all the partners,
sharing resources and information, and adjusting the partnership structure so
that the degree of influence exercised by the dominant partner is formally
limited.
Demands by the public for a better, more efficient and effective public
service have not fallen on deaf ears. While a number of factors have
contributed to the recent innovations in public sector management, the current
period of fiscal restraint has played an important role in motivating
governments to find new ways of doing business. This financial environment
is unfortunate in that many innovations pursued by governments may be
perceived by the public as an attempt by government to offload its
responsibilities. Such has been the case with partnerships. While most of
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the participants in these arrangements are satisfied with the outcome of the
partnerships and the degree to which they have become involved in policy-
making, negative perceptions regarding the government's motivation continue
to be held by stakeholders and public officials themselves. Partnerships
reflect more than just an opportunity for government to 'do more with less.'
They reflect a recognition by government that many of society's problems
cross the boundaries between interests and jurisdictions. As a result, the
development of solutions to these problems requires the input and expertise
of a wide variety of interests. The assumption that government is the sole
possessor of knowledge and, therefore, the only entity which can solve
extensive problems no longer reflects the realities of life in a global society.
We must accept, therefore, a new horizontal approach to problem-solving;
an approach which promotes greater levels of public participation and the
involvement of various disciplines and interests.
The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources has displayed its commitment
to partnership development in its policy direction and program delivery.
While there are clearly areas requiring improvement, this attempt to
incorporate a new philosophy for resource management into a departmental
strategy is commendable. It is hoped that the current emphasis on partnership
continues within this ministry until staff at all levels within the organization
embrace both the concept and practice of partnership.
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PARTNERSHIPS
WHAT ARE PARTNERSHIPS?
A relationship involving the sharing of power,
work, support and/or information with others
for the achievement of joint goals and/or
mutual benefits.
Broad Definition:
Appendix A
i.e. Co-managed AboriginallEIC boards to develop a trained
Aboriginal labour force.
Strict Definition: A formal agreement to share power with others in
the pursuit of joint goals and/or mutual benefits.
A/ Collaborative partnerships: Each partner exercises power in
the decision-making process. Ideally, decisions are made by
building a consensus. Partners usually are mutually dependent
and pool resources such as money, information and labour to
reach objectives.
Partnerships, while existing in various forms in the private sector, are
fairly recent to the field of public administration. There are, however,
a number of different classification systems which could be used when
identifying specific partnership arrangements. For the purpose of this
examination, partnership arrangements will be classified on the basis of
the nature and extent of power (often in the form of influence)
exercised by the partners.
HOW ARE PARTNERSHIPS CLASSIFIED?
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B/ Consultative partnerships: Advice is solicited from individuals,
groups and organizations outside of government. Little real
power-sharing exists as control is usually retained by
government. Partners can often exercise substantial influence on
government decisions in a variety of ways. These partnerships
sometimes evolve into true collaborative partnerships.
i.e. Wawa Remote Tourism Association
C/ Operational Partnerships: Characterized by a sharing of work
of a physical or non-physical nature. May share resources.
Power (control) usually retained by government but partners
usually exercise some degree of influence over one another.
i.e. MNR and private sector share work and expense of
conducting fish population surveys.
D/ Contributory Partnerships: Involves the provision of financial
or other assistance without operational involvement. Often not
considered a true partnership due to lack of decision-making
involvement or influence by all players.
i.e. Conservation Officer Centennial Sponsorship
It should be noted that while these category definitions provide a basis for
comparison and evaluation of partnership arrangements, in practice, specific
arrangements often satisfy the criteria associated with more than one category.
In addition, there is a tendency for partnership arrangements to evolve from
one type to another as circumstances within the policy environment change.
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Appendix B
Questionnaire
Government Partnerships Within The
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources
Please provide the following information regarding one sample partnership of each type
(i.e. decision-making, advisory, etc.) within your District.
Collaborative
Name of Partnership:
Purpose of Partnership: _
Partners Involved:
Contact Person:
Consultative
Name of Partnership:
Partners Involved:
Contact Person:
Operational
Name of Partnership:
Partners Involved:
Contact Person:
Contributory
Name of Partnership:
Partners Involved:
Contact Person:
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Appendix C
Government Partnerships Within The OMNR
Questionnaire· Government Partners
General
1. What are the objectives and goals of the partnership?
2. Why was the partnership created?
3. Describe the political, social and economic environment within which the
partnership was created.
4. How was the partnership created? Who was involved?
5. Describe the policy environment surrounding this particular partnership within the
OMNR.
Formalization and Equity
6. Does the partnership have a formal terms of reference or other guidelines? How
were they developed and by whom? Do they reflect the interests of all partners?
7. What is the makeup of the partnership? How are members selected? Are all
significant stakeholders represented?
8. What influence does each partner bring to the partnership? Are resources being
shared by all partners?
9. How are decisions made within the partnership? Do all partners understand and
accept this process?
10. Describe the general operation of the partnership. How often do partners meet etc.?
Committment
11. Describe the OMNR's involvement within the partnership.
12. What resource committments have been made to the partnership (i.e. human
resources, material, finances)?
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13. Is the OMNR generally willing to accept the recommendations resulting from the
partnership? How has the partnership been integrated into the formal processes of
the OMNR?
14. Are there binding principles or philosophies which all partners share?
Accountability
15. How are decisions made within the partnership? Once a decision or
recommendation has been made, what is the next step? Who retains ultimate
responsibility for decisions made in or relating to the partnership?
16. What is the reporting relationship between partners? Do all partners clearly
understand this relationship as well as the organizational structure within which the
partnership functions?
17. What reports (i.e. annual reports, minutes) are submitted to the OMNR by the
partnership? Who is responsible for the development and approval of these reports?
18. Do all partners report regularly on the activities of the partnership to the
organizations which they represent?
Outcome
19. Are decisions being made in a more consensual way than prior to the partnership?
20. Does the public have a greater level of 'buy in' to OMNR policies and programs
since the establishment of the partnership?
21. How successful has the partnership been in achieving its objectives? Has it evolved
over time? Are its objectives still valid?
22. Has the partnership met your expectations? Why? Has your attitude regarding the
other partners or the policy process itself changed?
23. What factors do you feel are necessary to the maintenance of a successful
partnership? What problems has the partnership encountered along the way?
24. Final comments:
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Appendix D
PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN THE OMNR
Questionnaire - Non-Government Partners
General
1. What are the objectives and goals of the partnership?
2. Why was the partnership created?
3. Describe the political, social and economic environment within which the
partnership was created.
4. How was the partnership created? Who was involved?
5. What was the nature of your relationship with the OMNR prior to the creation of
the partnership? Did you publicly critique OMNR policies on occasion, and if so,
to what extent?
Formalization and Equity
6. Does the partnership have a formal terms of reference or other guidelines? How
were they developed and by whom? Do they reflect the interests of all partners?
7. What is the makeup of the partnership? How are members selected? Are all
significant stakeholders represented?
8. What influence does each partner bring to the partnership? Are resources being
shared by all partners?
9. How are decisions made within the partnership? Do all partners understand and
accept this process?
10. Describe the general operation of the partnership. How often do partners meet etc.?
Committment
11. Describe the OMNR's involvement within the partnership.
12. What resource committments have been made to the partnership (i.e. human
resources, material, finances)?
13. Is the OMNR generally willing to accept the recommendations resulting from the
partnership? How has the partnership been integrated into the formal processes of
the OMNR?
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14. Are there binding principles or philosophies which all partners share?
Accountability
15. How are decisions made within the partnership? Once a decision or
recommendation has been made, what is the next step? Who retains ultimate
responsibility for decisions made in or relating to the partnership?
16. What is the reporting relationship between partners? Do all partners clearly
understand this relationship as well as the organizational structure within which the
partnership functions?
17. What reports (i.e. annual reports, minutes) are submitted to the OMNR by the
partnership? Who is responsible for the development and aproval of these reports?
18. Do all partners report regularly on the activities of the partnership to the
organizations which they represent?
Outcome
19. Are decisions being made in a more consensual way than prior to the partnership?
Do you perceive yourself as having more input into the policy planning or
implementation processes of the OMNR?
20. What is the nature of your relationship with the OMNR now? Has it changed as
a result of the partnership?
21. Do you feel the need to criticize OMNR policy now that you are operating within
a government partnership? If so, is it easier or more difficult now?
22. Does the public have a greater level of 'buy in' to OMNR policies and programs
since the establishment of the partnership?
23. How successful has the partnership been in achieving its objectives? Has it evolved
over time? Are its objectives still valid?
24. Has the partnership met your expectations? Why? Has your attitude regarding the
other partners or the policy process itself changed?
25. What factors do you feel are necessary to the maintenance of a successful
partnership? What problems has the partnership encountered along the way?
26. Final comments:
STRYOF NATURAL RESOURCES PARTNERSHIPS QUESTIONAIRE
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Appendix E
YES
YES
NE
RECEIVF.D
............. YES
Superior
LAKES:
Tweed District
Huron YES
Erie ' '. YES
Midhurst District ... e • • • • •• YES
Ontario' 0.............. . •...
Cambridge District YES
Aylmer District 0 • • • • • • • • •• YES
KemptvUle District ..... · · ·
Maple District e ~ ~ NO
SOurHERN REGION:
Temagami Di$trict........ YES
Sudbury District YES
Sa~lt St~" Marie District . . .. YES
Parry Sound District YES
North Bay District .. ..... YES
'Pembroke. District·........ YES
Bancroft District YES
CENTRAL REGION:
DISTRICT
. Algonquin Park Distric~
YES
YES
RECEIVED?
Co~hrane District
Chapleau District
Hearst District e .0 ..• NO
NORTHEAST REGION: ... It • • •
Timmins District YES
Wawa District .... e' ~ • • .. • ... YES
Moosoonee District e .. .. o. • .. •. ' YES
Kirkland Lake District·· ...'... YES
Thunder Bay District 0 • • • .. •• YES
Red Lake District YES
Sioux Lookout District . . . . .. YES
Nipigon District .. e •••• It • It. YES
Kenora District .. "........ YES
Geraldton District YES
Fort Frances District YES
Dryden Disu:ict .....•...•. YES
NORTIiWEST REGION:
DISTRICT
January 7) 1993
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Appendix F
Bass Conserve Zones
Gypsy Moth
Tripartite Prog.
East Onto Forestry
Devel. Prog.
Wendaban Stewardship
Authority
West Sydenhan Valley
Mgmt.·, Area
Algonquin For. Auth.
Sequin Rec. Trail
Bd.of Manitoba
Partnership
KEMPTVILLE
TWEED
AYLMER
CAMBRIDGE
Southern Region
TEMAGAMI
ALGONQUIN
SLT.STE.MARIE Tupper/Shields Co-
Mgmt.Committee
PARRY SOUND
Central Region
District
A. Collaborative
Lk. Huron Liaison Camm.
Community Act.Prog.
Romeo Mallette FMA
Habitat Based Wildlife
Assessmt.Subarc.Cst.*
Kesagami Prove Park
Whitedog Area Res.Camm.
Superior For.FMA
Nakina FAC
Handicapped Hunting
Manitou FMA
Rossport lsI. Mgrnt.
Board
Partnership
HURON
SUPERIOR
Lakes
MOOSONEE
NOT YET RECATEGORIZED: MIDHURST: Dufferin Cnty. Agreement Forest
TIMMINS
KENDRA
Northeast Region
COCHRANE
CHAPLEAU
NIPIGON
THUNDER BAY
GERALDTON
Northwest R~ion
FT .. FRANCIS
District
SLT.STE.MARIE Local Citizens Camm.
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Bay of Quinte RAP
Lk.Erie Committee
SevenSound Public
Advisory Committee
Remedial Action Plan
for WeIland River
VETAC
Temagami Trails
James Berry Drain
Demonstration
Ottawa Valley
Sawmillers Assoc.*
Local Citizens Corom.
Blackstone Harbour
Provo Park Advisory
Committee
Leaseholders Assoc.
of Algonquin Park
Partnership
TWEED
MIDHURST
Southern Region
TEMAGAMI
SUDBURY
PEMBROKE
NORTH BAY
PARRY SOUND
ALGONQUIN
Central Region
District
B. Consultative
Lk. Sup. Advisory Camm. ERIE
Lk. Huron Advisory Camm.
CAMBRIDGE
Magpie CO-Mgmt.Committee
District Advisory Comm. AYLMER
Aulneau Wildlife
Peninsula Mgmt.Grp.
Lac des Milles Lacs
Advisory Committee
Trout Lake Co-Mgmt.
Group
Steel River ern.
Mgmt. Unit Public
Advisory Committee
Fish. Advisory
Committee
Partnership
SUPERIOR
HURON
MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES PARTNERSHIPS
* May overlap into other categories
KIRKLAND LAKE Elk Lake Community
Forest
CHAPLEAU Biscotasing Public
Advisory Committee
WAWA
TIMMINS
~ortheast Region
KENDRA
SIOUX LOOKOUT M.A.P.B. Committee
RED LAKE
THUNDER' BAY
NIPIGON
Northwest Region
FT. FRANCIS
District
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* May overlap other categories
**Depending on degree of operational involvement of MNR
Friends of Camden
Lake
Aerial Sport Fishing
Survey
Tree Planting Cons.
Authority
Landowner/Steward.
Initiatives
Long Point Mgmt.
Unit
Algonquin College
Education Program
Fed. Onto Cottagers
Project Canoe
Peregrin Falcon Re-
lease Program
Healy Lake Cottager
Association
Sturgeon Fish Re-
covery Prog. .
Friends of Alqon.
Partnership
ERIE
MIDHURST
TWEED
AYLMER
CAMBRIDGE
BANCROFT
TEMAGAMI
Southern Region
SUDBURY
PEMBROKE
NORTH BAY
ALGONQUIN
PARRY SOUND
Central Region
District
c. Operational
Lake Herring Assessrnt.
Lake Huron Technical
Committee
Bd. of Education
Environ. Awareness
Wabaseemoong Garb.
Dump
Eagle Lake Conserve
Group*
CFIP Walleye Trans.*
Trout Lake Waste
Mgmt. Site
Peregrine Falcon
Release Program
CFIP **
Partnership
Lakes
SUPERIOR
HURON
COCHRANE Abitibi Model Forest
CHAPLEAU Chapleau Boy Scouts
CFIP *
KIRKLAND LAKE Eastern Habit. Joint
Venture
Northeast Region
TIMMINS
KENORA
RED LAKE
DRYDEN
NIPIGON
THUNDER BAY
Northwest Region
FT. FRANCIS
District
* may overlap into other categories
**depending on degree of operational involvement of MNR
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Fish Habitat Mapping
CFIP*
Fisheries Stream
Improve. Rehab.**
CFIP & CWIP *
Nature Club
Temagami Fishing
Maps
Lk.Nipissing &
Conservation
Fund Raising with
Private Sector
Partnership
TWEED
MIDHURST
CAMBRIDGE
TEMAGAMI
Southern Region
NORTH BAY
SLT.STE.MARIE Operation Tree
Plant
PARRY SOUND
ALGONQUIN
Central Region
District
D. Contributory
Remedial Action Plan
Education Forest
Laboratory
Moose Hunter Educ/
Rifle Sight-in*
Moose/Deerhide
Collection Prog.
Partnership
Lakes
SUPERIOR
TIMMINS
Northeast Region
THUNDER BAY
Northwest Region
FT. FRANCIS
District
-flSh
.. wildlife
.. forest areas
futite
"
.. cottagetS
-outfitters
- timber contractors
M"" IInlng. ~I ,r:
.f:l.si i!
I
Ontario ~esidents :
I '\:--.. -..~.-
Logging in-general
.. concern re: access
10 remote lakes ---------------
.. declining remoteness
,
-, ,,"
. /
Dubreuil
Saw Mill
~ Private Lumber
Operators
.. some issues n:: wood supply
to small contractors
•
•
I (rates)
•
•
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f\Ppepdj.~ G
SOC/OG M:
SITUATION AS IT EXISTS INTH~MAGPIE FOREST
Magpie Forest Co-Management Committee
Reiationship
-"hunters "-
fishennen : \.
Local Residents'·
-- collaborative
.. _ .._- cool. distant little involvement
- - - _ .. difficult. confrontation
Great Lakes Power
Hydro
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